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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN APPLIED MICROECONOMICS
ON MEXICO
BY
FRANCISCO BELTRAN-SILVA
MARCH 2020

Committee Chair: Dr. Alberto Chong
Major Department: Economics

This dissertation comprises three chapters on applied microeconomics that study different
economic aspects around the intersection between street violence and nutrition in the context of
Mexico. The first and pivot chapter, titled “Military Interventions and Obesity: Evidence from
Mexico’s Drug War”, studies the relationship street violence and body weight. This chapter
examines if exposure to street violence originated in the military interventions against the drug
trafficking organizations (DTOs) that started in 2006 in Mexico had an impact on weight using
longitudinal data from a household survey. My results indicate that military operations affect
weight positively, increasing overweight although not to the extent of inducing obesity.
The second chapter, titled “Will Violent Crime Incentivize the Hiding of Small Firms?”,
explores the impact from street violence on a different outcome: tax compliance. This chapter
examines the relationship between crime exposure and informality of businesses using a rotating

panel survey matched to municipal homicide rates. My hypothesis is that losses derived from
crime may take away income that could otherwise be used to afford formality. Also, firms may
prefer to stay underground to avoid disclosing their existence to criminals. I find that exposure to
violent crime promotes informality. These results are further corroborated by using temperature
as an instrumental variable.
The third chapter, “Fighting Against Hunger: A Country-Wide Intervention and its
Impact on Birth Outcomes,” steps away from the crime scene to focus on nutrition again. This
chapter studies the impact of Sin Hambre (SH), a food assistance program introduced in Mexico
in 2013, on birth weight. I use a difference in difference approach exploiting timing and regional
variations in exposure to evaluate the impact of the overall program on birthweight. Since
municipalities were not randomly assigned, linear regression methodologies may lead to biased
estimates. In order to address these concerns and obtain causal estimates, I employ a multiperiod
difference-in-difference matching method. I find that exposure to SH leads to moderate impacts
on birth weight at best.
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1 Introduction
The present dissertation comprises three chapters on applied microeconomics that study different
economic aspects around the intersection between street violence and nutrition in the context of
Mexico.
The first chapter in my dissertation examines if exposure to military operations against
the drug trafficking organizations in Mexico caused any changes in weight-related outcomes
using the number of operations from military records and longitudinal data from the Mexican
Family Life Survey (MXFLS). My hypothesis is that these policies and the subsequent violence
triggered, affected weight-related outcomes by inducing stress as well as by affecting food
consumption and physical activity behaviors. I estimate a generalized difference in difference
model that exploits the presumably exogenous regional variations in the number of military
operations while controlling for selective migration. My results indicate that military operations
affect weight positively, increasing overweight although not to the extent of inducing obesity.
Using a score designed to diagnose depression I provide evidence that emotional well-being
affections may lead these effects. Exploring other potential mechanisms, I cannot rule out that
food expenditures and reductions in physical activity are potential drivers, but estimates are
mostly insignificant. Therefore, observed changes may originate in metabolism alterations due to
stress.
The second chapter in my dissertation examines the relationship between exposure to
violent crime and firm informality. I employ a rotating panel survey matched to municipal
homicide rates and temperature as an instrument for homicide rates and find that exposure to
violent crime causes existing firms to become informal. My hypothesis is that losses derived
from crime may take away income that could otherwise be used to afford formality. Also, firms
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may prefer to stay underground to avoid disclosing their existence to criminals. I find that
exposure to violent crime promotes informality. On average an additional homicide per 10,000
people each quarter increases the probability to be informal between 0.6 percentage points and
1.1 percentage points. These results are further corroborated when using temperature as an
instrumental variable, which indicates that these estimates range between 13.7 percentage points
and 17.3 percentage points.
The third chapter estimates the impact of Sin Hambre (SH), a food assistance policy
implemented in Mexico in 2013 on birth weight and other birth related outcomes. This national
policy is a broad targeting and coordination strategy involving a large set of programs from
several ministries aiming to fight hunger. I use a difference in difference approach exploiting
timing and regional variations in exposure to evaluate the impact of the overall program on
birthweight. Since municipalities were not randomly assigned, linear regression methodologies
may lead to biased estimates. In order to address these concerns and obtain causal estimates, I
employ a multiperiod difference-in-difference matching method proposed by Imai, Kim and
Wang (2020), which compares each treated unit to a control unit constructed to be similar to the
treated observation in terms of outcome and covariate histories.1 I find that exposure to SH leads
to moderate impacts on birth weight at best. I observe an impact of at most 5 grams for the
national sample. Focusing on income eligible women only, estimates indicate an impact of at
most 9 grams. Estimates, however, are not robust across specifications and some estimates point
into null effects. Results using other methodologies lead to similar conclusions where some
beneficial impact is observed but not for all specifications.

1

Imai, K., Kim, I.S. and Wang, E., 2020. Matching Methods for Causal Inference with Time-Series Cross-Sectional
Data.
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2 Military Interventions and Obesity: Evidence from Mexico’s Drug
War
2.1 Introduction
Economic literature indicates that increasing rates in obesity can be explained by several
economic factors including technological change, income, food prices, urban sprawl, labor force
participation, among others. 2 According to recent literature, exposure to street violence,
measured through crime rates, could also be a relevant determinant of obesity (Yu et al., 2016).
This research is mostly associational and the gap in the literature exists for two reasons. First,
because of legal and ethical constraints, lab designs cannot induce realistic levels of stress like
those ascribed to street violence. Second, quasi-experimental study designs are difficult given the
rarity of exogenous sources of variation in street violence that could address endogeneity
concerns.
The military interventions against the drug-trafficking-organizations (DTOs) that started
in Mexico in 2006 provide an opportunity to study the effect of street violence on obesity. The so
called “war on drugs” turned Mexico into one of the most violent nations. Including civilians not
directly involved in the conflict, the country observed a death toll of roughly 234,000 homicides
from 2006 to 2017 (Hernández Borbolla, 2017). Anecdotal evidence documented by newspapers
reports people responded by taking shelter indoors to avoid the risks of an ongoing outdoors
violence ("Violencia en Ciudad Juárez," 2009; "Tierra sin ley," 2011; "Golpea la violencia al
turismo," 2012; Solera et al., 2012). These context raises questions on the health-related
consequences associated with the conflict. Previous literature already documents evidence in this

2

For further discussion see Hill et al. (1999), Cutler et al. (2003), Chou et al. (2004), Lakdawalla et al. (2005) and
Courtemanche et al. (2016).
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direction as it shows drug-related violence, measured through homicide rates, is associated with
deleterious impacts on low birthweight and depression, yet, other measures of health have been
ignored (Brown 2016, Balmori et al. 2015).3 My hypothesis is that the military conflict could
have affected weight related outcomes by inducing stress as well as by affecting food
consumption and physical activity behaviors. Aside from the violent ground, Mexico is ideal to
study this question as it has become one of the countries with the highest rates of obesity after
the United States.4 Since obesity is notoriously costly in terms of medical care spending, chronic
conditions incidence, and death rates exploring this subject is of particular interest to Mexico
(Flegal et al., 2005; Cawley et al., 2012; Sturm, 2012). 5 Lastly, the fact that medical
infrastructure, namely clinics and hospitals, was not destroyed along the conflict makes this
military conflict especially appealing.
The military interventions had their way triggering violence through several pathways.
First, they provoked a crossfire between the DTOs and official authorities, that is military, navy
and police forces. Second, by taking down former heads of historically large DTOs they led to
the creation of multiple smaller DTOs which created further violence (Castillo et al., 2013).
Lastly, not only the DTOs, but also the military committed human rights violations which
affected civilians (Jiménez-Cáliz, 2017). Military operations records are a novel and arguably
better measure of the distress caused by the conflict than homicide rates, the norm across related
literature. First, military convoys are visible through highways and main roads, as opposed to

3

Similarly, such literature has generally found drug-related violence, measured through homicide rates, adversely
affects outcomes like migration (Basu et al., 2013, Atuesta et al., 2016), educational attainment (Márquez-Padilla et
al., 2015, Jarillo et al., 2016, Brown et al., 2017), risk aversion (Brown et al., 2017), perception of insecurity
(Gutiérrez-Romero 2016), economic activity (Robles et al., 2013, Enamorado et al., 2014) and household
expenditures (Velásquez 2010), among others.
4
According to the World Health Organization (2017) as of 2015 the rate of obesity in Mexico was 32.4% while that
in the US was 38.2%.
5
For instance, Cawley et al. (2012) estimate that the annual cost of treating obesity in the US is equivalent to 16.5%
of all national medical care spending.
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homicides, many of which do not occur in public venues and so are not noticeable. Second,
military operations are a direct measure of the intensity of policy to be analyzed. Homicide rates,
for instance, may not capture the impacts from military assaults not resulting in deaths.6 Third,
given that homicides are not classified with enough detail and many are not reported, any index
of drug-related violence is subject to measurement error. Fourth, given its unprecedented nature
the exogeneity of military operations can be unambiguously evaluated through an event study.7
Admittedly, an inherent disadvantage of military operations is that records are only available at
year by state level which misses to capture the effect from independent variations at a finer level.
This paper is relevant for several reasons. First, to the best of my knowledge, I am the
first to analyze the impact of exposure to military operations on weight. Second, given the
unprecedented nature of military interventions my paper is the first to provide causal evidence on
the link between street violence and weight. Third, the use of the number of military operations
introduces an alternative and cleaner identification to study the impact of this type of conflicts on
other outcomes as it overcomes endogeneity concerns inherent to homicide rates. Fourth,
different from research that studies the effect of violence on weight only, I explore several
potential mechanisms including depression symptoms, safety perceptions, consumption and
physical activity in the same longitudinal setting.
The paper is structured in the following way. Section 2 presents a theoretical framework
to illustrate how street violence could affect weight. Section 3 details the data to be used. Section
4 describes the empirical methodology. Section 5 presents results. Finally, Section 6 outlines
conclusions.

6

Figure 2.1 in the Appendix shows the evolution of both military operations and homicide rates.
Information from the Ministry of Defense (SEDENA) also shows soldiers by state are constant until 2006,
indicating there were no operations of this nature prior to December 2006, at least since 2000.
7
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2.2 Theoretical framework
Based on related literature I assume weight is related to caloric intake and energy expenditure
through the following linear relationship:
𝑊𝑖 = 𝑘𝑖 (𝐹) − 𝑒𝑖 (𝑃, ℎ)

(1)

where increases in caloric consumption, 𝑘𝑖 (𝐹), increase weight though food consumption, 𝐹, and
increases in energy expenditure 𝑒𝑖 (𝑃, ℎ) counteract these increases via physical activity, 𝑃, and
physiological processes, ℎ. The term 𝑖 indicate functional differences across individuals due to
lifestyle and genetics.
Stress can be defined as any situation that disturbs the equilibrium between a living
organism and its environment like an injury, noise or personal problems (Ranabir et al., 2011). I
argue that street violence is one such stressor. Evidence on the links between stress and weight
suggest such relationship arises from behavioral and somatic responses that affect both 𝐹 and 𝑃,
where somatic responses refer to involuntary changes inherent to the body while behavioral
responses include deliberate changes (De Vriendt et al., 2009).8
On somatic responses, literature points out that in general, stress promotes obesity by
affecting appetite and altering physical activity.9 About food consumption, literature indicates
stress might be linked to neurotransmitters and hormones that control appetite causing what is
known as stress-eating, (Björntorp, 2001; Torres et al., 2007; Epel et al., 2001; Oliver et al.,
2000). Regarding physical activity, 𝑃, evidence documents there is a negative causal relationship
between stress and physical activity mainly expressed through depression episodes where a
positive relationship is found only among people already in the habit of exercise (Stults8

Consensus is that in response to a stressor the sympathetic nervous system sends a signal that additional energy is
required to face a threat which if left unused can lead to weight gain (Foss et al., 2011, Ranabir et al., 2011).
9
The effect that stress, measured by cortisol levels, has on obesity is well documented in the medical literature
(Rosmond et al., 1998, Björntorp et al., 2000, Björntorp, 2001, Bose et al., 2009, Ranabir et al., 2011).
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Kolehmainen et al., 2014).10 Recent findings also show that daily stressors and past depression
can alter metabolism and promote obesity by decreasing post meal energy expenditures (KiecoltGlaser et al., 2015), the latter of which would affect the functional form of 𝑒𝑖 .
In terms of behavioral responses, street violence could affect weight by altering physical
activity and food consumption patterns. This is plausible if outdoors activities are costlier due to
insecurity although individual differences on preferences and proximity to different goods will
rule such relationship. Behavioral changes could also promote somatic changes if spending more
time at home reinforces appetite distortions while further dissuading physical activity,
(Santaliestra-Pasías et al., 2013; Aceves-Martins et al., 2016). 11 Insecurity could have the
opposite effect if, for instance, it reduces visits to fast-food like restaurants and street-vendors
stands. Furthermore, street violence could affect decisions related to working, commuting and
entertainment alternatives which involve different bundles of food and physical activity. The
former insights suggest that somatic responses to street violence may lead to increases in weight
but that behavioral responses could go either way.

2.3 Data
The data I use for the analysis comes from three main sources. The first is the Mexican Family
Life Survey (MxFLS), which I use to obtain information on weight related outcomes as well as
depression symptoms, safety perceptions, food consumption and physical activity to explore
potential mechanisms. MxFLS is a longitudinal survey conducted in three waves: the first,

10

Since physical activity has beneficial effects on stress coping capacity, mental health, and weight regulation,
reductions in physical activity following stressful events could have further adverse effects (De Vriendt et al., 2009;
Stults-Kolehmainen et al., 2014).
11
TV viewing has widely been identified to promote unhealthy food preferences through exposure to food
advertisements, a higher energy intake by automatic eating, and overconsumption caused by distraction. Similarly,
insecurity could motivate purchases of packaged versus fresh food. Packaged foods can be highly caloric and can
contain food additives known to decrease circulating leptin, a hormone that helps inhibiting hunger (Ciardi et al.,
2012; Mangge et al., 2013).
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MxFLS-1, in 2002, the second, MxFLS-2, from 2005 to 2006, and the third, MxFLS-3, from
2009 to 2012.12 The second source consists of records on military operations per state and year
from the Mexican Secretariat of National Defense (SEDENA- Secretaría de la Defensa
Nacional). 13 These records distinguish between two types of operations: eradications, which
target drug fields, and interceptions, which target drug-related traffic through land vehicle
checkpoints and surveillance stations that focus on air and water routes. 14 The third is
administrative data on daily homicides collected by the National Institute of Statistics and
Geography (INEGI- Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía) to estimate state and
municipality homicide rates by month and year as an alternative measure of the conflict
intensity.
The main outcomes from MxFLS consist of Body Mass Index (BMI), as well as binary
indicators for ranges of BMI indicating underweight, (BMI<18.5), normal weight
(18.5≤BMI<25), overweight (25≤BMI<30) and obesity (30≤BMI). 15 These weight related
outcomes are derived using clinically measured observations of height and weight. Secondary
outcomes comprise safety perceptions, depression, food consumption and physical activity
outcomes. Safety perceptions refer to self-reported measures related to insecurity. Depression is
quantified based on 20 questions that are used to diagnose depressive syndrome in Mexico.
These questions, designed and tested by researchers from the Mexican Institute of Psychiatry to
help diagnosing depression syndrome, can be answered in negative or positive form, in which
three possibilities are accepted: sometimes, many times, and all the time. Answers are given a
MxFLS-1 collects information on 16 of Mexico’s 32 states and is representative of the national population in
2002. MxFLS-2 and MxFLS-3 relocates and re-interviews almost 90 percent of the original households sampled
through MxFLS-1. MxFLS re-interviews include individuals or households that grew out from previous samples and
those who migrated, the latter of which added observations from other states.
13
Data on military operations were acquired via direct request of SEDENA.
14
Figure 2.2 shows the cumulative number of military operations by state for different years.
15
BMI is a weight-to-height ratio calculated by dividing a person’s weight in kilograms by the square of its height in
meters.
12
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value of 1 if negative (No) and a value of 2 to 4 if positive, according to a progressive order.
Consequently, the scale of measurement that quantifies the depressive syndrome can take any
value between 20 and 80. I use both the depression score and binary indicators based on
thresholds determined by the Mexican Institute of Psychiatry that define mild, moderate and
severe depression. Consumption outcomes consist of food expenses made a week prior to the
interview at the household level. Consumption measures are additionally adjusted by household
monthly income to disentangle the direct impact of military interventions on food consumption
composition away from changes in economic activity that affected income and thus
consumption. To explore if there are shifts in diet expenses, these are classified in groups based
on caloric content and common food classifications. Physical activity comprises binary and
hours per week indicators for weekly exercise and sports activities.

2.4 Methodology
The main sample consists of adults that are interviewed on all three waves and are 18 years or
older at the time of their first interview. Since the exact timing of military interventions is
ignored, operations are assigned by year of interview. My methodology consists of a generalized
difference-in-differences approach taking advantage of the staggered nature of eradication and
interception operations across states and years.16 The main specification can be written in the
following form:
𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼 + Π𝑀𝑠𝑡 + 𝑋 ′ 𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝛽 + +𝛾𝑡 + 𝛾𝑠 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡

(2)

where 𝑦𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the outcome variable for individual 𝑖 in state 𝑠 and year 𝑡, 𝑀𝑠𝑡 are the number of
military operations in state 𝑠 and year 𝑡, 𝑋 ′ 𝑖𝑠𝑡 is a vector of demographic control variables, 𝛾𝑡 , 𝛾𝑠
and 𝛾𝑖 are year, state and individual fixed effects, respectively, 𝛼 is the regression intercept, and
16

Since the conflict started in December of 2006, the three waves from MxFLS provide information for two pretreatment years (2002, 2005) and 5 post-treatment years (2006, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012).
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𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 represents the idiosyncratic error term. Individual fixed effects, 𝛾𝑖 , are essential as these
account for time-invariant unobservables related to lifestyles, genetics, and preferences.17 𝑀𝑠𝑡
corresponds to the sum of interceptions and eradications operations. I also generate estimates
using both counts in the same specification under the caveat of collinearity. Since time fixed
effects capture trends at the national level, I alternatively include region by year fixed effects to
allow for different trends subnationally.18 Since some individuals may move to safer locations in
response to street violence, to control for selective migration I use the location where the
individual lived during the first wave of MxFLS to assign exposure. I cluster errors at the state
level to correct for the loss of independent variation within the states. If government
interventions conditional on controls are exogenous, the following condition will hold:
𝐸[𝜀𝑖𝑠𝑡 |𝑠, 𝑡, 𝑖, 𝑋𝑖𝑠𝑡 ] = 0.

(3)

Alternatively, since weight related outcomes may not respond immediately, I use military
operations from the previous year. Using the previous year operations could also improve the
identification as the exact timing of operations within a year is unknown. Along the same lines, I
study if the effect from cumulative operations using the sum of contemporaneous and previous
years’ operations. Furthermore, to study the dynamics associated with the impact of military
operations, I implement distributed lag models including the five previous and subsequent years
separately.
A latent concern from studying the relationship between street violence and obesity is
endogeneity, particularly that arising from residential self-selection. 19 In the case of military
17

Given the inclusion of individual fixed effects, state fixed effects are meaningful to the extent that individuals
move across states. For specifications analyzing outcomes related to food consumption 𝑖 refers to the household.
18
The regional division used originates in the 2006 Mexican National Development Plan and was the one
considered by MxFLS to do the sampling process. States belonging to each region are presented in Table 2.8.
19
Residential self-selection in this context refers to the idea that people are not randomly assigned but choose where
to live based on their preferences. Such endogeneity concerns may be more salient in other street violence measures
like homicide or property crime rates.
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operations this becomes an identification threat if people under socioeconomic conditions or
preferences that promote obesity are constraint or prefer living in neighborhoods that are targeted
more heavily by the military. In turn, my results could be driven by trends in state outcomes that
are correlated with the evolution of the military interventions. Thus, I evaluate this proposition
formally in an event study analysis. Specifically, I fit the following equation:
𝑁

𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑖 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝜋𝑗 1( 𝜏𝑠𝑡 = 𝑗) + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜆𝑠 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑠𝑡𝑖 + 𝜖𝑠𝑡𝑖

(4)

𝑗=−𝑁

where 𝜏𝑠𝑡 denotes the event year, defined so that 𝜏𝑠𝑡 = 0 if the outcome at state 𝑠 and year 𝑡
corresponds to the first year 𝑠 was intervened by the military, 𝜏 = 1 if the outcome corresponds
to one year after the first year 𝑠 was intervened, and so on. Outcomes corresponding to 𝜏 ≤ −1
pertain to years prior to an intervention in the corresponding state. Coefficients are measured
relative to 𝜏 = −1. I consider a window of five years before and five years after the first
intervention, N=5. The outermost indicators include all previous or subsequent periods beyond
five years respectively. If military operations are exogenous, coefficients corresponding to 𝜏 ≥ 0
should be statistically different from zero, and coefficients corresponding to 𝜏 ≤ −1 close to
zero.
Additionally, to judge if the effect found from military operations is rather due to
variations in homicide rates, I provide estimates using municipal homicide rates rates (per
10,000) as controls for military operations but also as the main source of variation. I run
specifications using either annual or monthly municipal homicide rates (per 10,000), the latter of
which can be paired to the month of interview.20

20

Homicide rates are assigned using MxFLS-1 as the exposure location, assuming that variations in homicide rates
are unrelated to residence choices prior to the conflict.
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2.5 Results
In this section I present the results from the empirical analysis, results on continuous outcomes
correspond to ordinary least squares while results on binary outcomes correspond to linear
probability models. The base specification (1) includes individual, year and state fixed effects.21
Specification (2) adds demographics.22 Specification (3) includes region by year fixed effects.
Specification (4) alternatively uses the current residence instead of that corresponding to
MXFLS-1 to assign treatment. Overall, controlling for selective migration seems to have little
impact on estimates which can be explained by a small fraction of people migrating out of their
initial location.23 Estimates represent the effect of an additional military operation. As reference
and to interpret estimates, the average number of military operations per year and state is of
around 2.5 operations, with some states having consecutively more than 5 operations on a yearly
basis.
Table 2.3 presents results from regressions of weight related outcomes on the number of
operations. As it can be observed these results point to an increase in BMI as a result of military
operations which is mainly resulting in shifts away from normal weight and into overweight
although not into obesity. 24 Given that underweight does not vary in response to military
operations within individuals, results for underweight are not presented. Estimates indicate that
on average an additional operation increases BMI by 25 up to 76 g (grams). I interpret BMI
coefficients in terms of grams (g) considering the average weight and height from the sample

21

Although Mexico is not known for having extremely cold weather, I check for cyclicality concerns by running
specifications using month indicators, which produce little changes in estimates.
22
Demographics include age, marital status, years of education, employment status, household size, household
earnings per month, and rural status.
23
Roughly 300 out of 7,500 individuals in the sample migrated to a different state during the period of analysis.
Specifications removing individuals who migrated out of the state they lived in 2002 show equivalent results.
24
Estimates including only individual fixed effects point into larger impacts on weight gain, however, not including
year and state fixed effects in this context may fail to capture important unobservables.
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used are 70 kilograms (kg) and 1.6 meters (m). Similarly, an additional operation increases the
probability of overweight by 0.3 up to 0.5% and reduces the probability of normal weight by 0.2
up to 0.4%. Assessing results for different groups suggests effects are positively larger among
females, family dependents, younger, more educated, and middle-income individuals, which is in
line with literature that shows effects of stress on weight differ based on age, gender and genetics
(Foss et al., 2011).
Figures 2.3 to 2.6 show the results from the event study analysis. These graphs permit to
test for pre-trends effects that would raise concerns about the validity of the identification
strategy. In all these graphs, the value at time -1 represents a reference category set to zero that
corresponds to a year prior to the event. The corresponding estimates suggest the hypothesis of
military operations being exogenous cannot be rejected as there are no discernable pre-trends.
The graphs also inform about year specific effects of military operations on outcomes
considered. In the case of weigh related outcomes such results point that the impact arising from
military operations could be compounding over the years. This is plausible as stressors could
continue to have an effect years after exposure. To further explore this possibility, I use
specifications using former years operations. Using operations from the previous year show
slightly larger impacts. Using cumulative operations, which includes the sum of the
contemporaneous and the last five years operations, point into similar conclusions. Implementing
distributed lag models supports the event study results as operations from the same year and lags
affect outcomes contrary to leads.
Since, there could be factors associated to states that both explain the military strategy
and weight related outcomes, I run separate regressions dropping outlier states based on
geographical size, population, gross domestic product per capita, and closeness to the border.

13

This analysis shows that the impact is higher in states bordering the US and those with smaller
areas, but differences in population size and GDP do not seem to drive results. Given that more
operations could reflect increased efforts to cover a larger ground and smaller states increase
chances of exposure I alternatively adjust the number of military operations by the size of the
state in square kilometers. Adjusting by size shows consistently similar results. Specifications
including eradications and interceptions as separate counts are consistent with the main results
although significance is lower which is occurs as the two counts are collinear.
Table 2.4 to Table 2.7 present results on potential mechanisms. Table 2.4 presents results
on safety perceptions. As it can be observed from this table, people appear to be more afraid of
being attacked or assaulted during day as well as during night, although effects during day are
larger. Similarly, people report to go out at night less frequently. Although people report to feel
less safe compared to five years ago such results are not significant across specifications. Table
2.5 presents results for depression symptoms. These results indicate that military operations
increase the depression score on average and move individuals away from the range associated
with no depression. Although effects are small, they suggest the prevalence of mild and moderate
depression, although not that of severe depression, increase in response to military operations.
Table 2.6 shows results using consumption outcomes. Unadjusted food expenditures
show mixed evidence, however, using food expenditures adjusted by income indicate that
expenditures on food overall increase indicating that diminishes in consumption could be
resulting from adverse economic conditions in line with former literature. All such estimates are,
however, insignificant. Regarding compositional changes, out of home food expenses appear to
increase proportionally more than home food expenditures, moreover, within home food
expenditures, classifying them by caloric content shows that high caloric items increase more
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than low caloric items.
Table 2.5 shows that doing exercise as well as time doing exercise responds negatively,
implying. Doing sports activities is unaffected although time doing sports activities does
increase. The latter is consistent with literature pointing that stress and exercise activity are
positively related among people already in the habit of exercise as its used as a way to cope with
stress (Stults-Kolehmainen et al., 2014). Although estimates on physical activity are insignificant
this may be reasonable. These results, however, cannot discard that physical activity associated
with working, commuting, entertainment or other activities changed. This is suggested from
results on Table 2.4 which show that in response to military operations people reported going out
at night less frequently.
Controlling for homicide rates in addition to military operations as well as using them
instead of military operations yield similar results. The effects from homicide rates, however,
seem to hold only in the short term. Monthly homicide rates affect outcomes measured in the
same month of interview, but annual homicide rates do not. Although variations in homicide
rates are a direct outcome from the military operations these specifications help assessing if the
contribution of military operations is meaningful or is just serving as a proxy for homicide rates.
These estimates, however, may not be interpret as causal.

2.6 Discussion
Overall results from this paper indicate that the military interventions that set off the “war on
drugs” have a nontrivial impact on weight related outcomes. Although the conflict did not seem
to affect the incidence of obesity, the increase in overweight could translate into future health
issues affecting health capital. Some health problems linked to overweight and obesity are type
two diabetes, high blood pressure, heart disease, certain cancers and pregnancy problems.
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Although risks in terms of developing health problems are more salient among people with
obesity, overweight poses similar threats. Since treating chronic health conditions linked to
overweight and obesity pose large costs in terms of medical care spending, my findings inform
policy makers in Mexico of potential subsequent health costs associated to the military conflict.
The findings of this paper provide causal evidence that street violence does impact weight related
outcomes providing support to the growing literature on the subject. Furthermore, analyzing
potential mechanisms this work provides a better understanding of this relationship. Specifically,
I observe an increase in the incidence of depression, particularly mild depression which is
consistent with the medical literature relating weight gain to stress and depression. Exploring
other potential mechanisms suggest weight changes are the result of changes in consumption
patterns and physical activity although these results are not significant indicating metabolic and
somatic responses to stress might play a rather important role driving this relationship.
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Figures
Figure12.1. Military operations and homicides
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Note: M refers to number of military operations and H refers to the homicide rate
per 10,000 population.

Figure22.2. Number of Military Operations

Note: Darker regions indicate a larger number of military operations.
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Figure32.3. Effect of military interventions on BMI, event study

Figure42.4. Effect of military interventions on overweight, event study
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Figure5 2.5. Effect of military interventions on obesity, event study

Figure62.6. Effect of military interventions on normal weight, event study
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Tables
Table12.1. Descriptive statistics, main variables

Weight
Body Mass Index (BMI)
Underweight (BMI<18.5)
Normal weight (18.5≤BMI<25)
Overweight (25≤BMI<30)
Obesity (30≤BMI)
Safety perceptions (ext. margins)
Fear of assault at day time
Fear of assault at night time
Going out at night frequently
Safety vs. 5 years ago
Safety measure: changing transportation
Safety measure: switching routes
Safety perceptions (int. margins)
Fear of assault at day time
Fear of assault at night time
Going out at night frequently
Safety vs. 5 years ago
Demographic controls
Age
Lives in Rural Locality
Years of Education
Employed
Earnings per month (pesos)
Married
Household size

N. Obs.

Mean

Std.

Min.

Max.

22,443
22,443
22,443
22,443
22,443

27.86
0.02
0.29
0.39
0.31

5.28
0.13
0.45
0.49
0.46

12
0
0
0
0

66
1
1
1
1

21,445
21,445
21,440
21,445
21,445
21,443

0.17
0.21
0.12
0.86
0.07
0.08

0.37
0.41
0.33
0.35
0.25
0.28

0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1

21,445
21,445
21,440
21,445

1.55
1.67
1.61
1.85

0.88
0.98
0.79
0.64

1
1
1
1

4
4
4
3

22,443
22,443
22,443
21,463
19,284
22,443
22,443

42.88
0.47
9.72
0.56
1,569.82
0.74
4.5

16.06
0.5
4.56
0.5
5,546.59
0.44
2.06

15
0
0
0
1
0
1

97
1
23
1
333,333
1
15

Notes: ext. stands for extensive margin and int. for intensive margin.
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Table22.2. Descriptive statistics, secondary variables

Depression
Depression score (DS)
No depression (DS<36)
Mild depression (36≤DS<46)
Moderate depression (46≤DS<66)
Severe depression (66≤DS)
Self-reported health (ext. margins)
Health status
Health status vs. one year ago
Health status for next year
Health status vs. same gender individuals
Health status (int. margins)
Health status
Health status vs. one year ago
Health status for next year
Health status vs. same gender individuals
Risky behaviors (ext. margins)
Alcohol
Smoking
Soft drinks
Risky behaviors (imt. margins)
Smoking (weekly number of cigarettes)
Physical activity
Exercise (ext. margin)
Exercise (daily hours)
Exercise (weekly days)
Exercise (implied weekly hours)
Sports (ext. margin)
Sports (weekly hours)
Household food expenditures (pesos)
Home food
High calories items
Low calories items
Out of home food
Household food expenditures (% of
income)
Home food
High calories items
Low calories items
Out of home food

N. Obs.

Mean

Std.

Min.

Max.

21,452
21,452
21,452
21,452
21,452

36.09
0.59
0.15
0.2
0.06

15.78
0.49
0.36
0.4
0.24

20
0
0
0
0

81
1
1
1
1

21,465
21,465
21,465
21,465

0.95
0.95
0.95
0.95

0.23
0.23
0.23
0.23

0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1

21,465
21,446
21,456
21,457

3.48
3.12
3.3
3.3

0.69
0.66
0.66
0.68

1
1
1
1

5
5
5
5

21,546
21,470
21,546

0.35
0.15
0.81

0.48
0.35
0.39

0
0
0

1
1
1

21,470

4.24

20.75

0

420

21,470
21,470
21,470
21,470
21,467
21,467

0.15
0.24
0.58
0.96
0.1
0.62

0.36
0.9
1.47
3.97
0.3
2.86

0
0
0
0
0
0

1
20
5
80
1
84

13,098
13,102
13,100
12,963

609.22
331.46
277.64
33.56

1064.29
492.37
743.71
133.37

0
0
0
0

71,587
21,213
50,374
7,500

10,947
10,950
10,948
10,839

47.41
25.65
21.75
2.66

833.61
530.05
311.48
109.58

0
0
0
0

82,000
53,100
28,900
10,000

Notes: ext. stands for extensive margin and int. for intensive margin.
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Table 32.3. Military operations and weight related outcomes
(1)
BMI

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.130***
(0.016)
27.89
21475

0.010
(0.009)
27.89
21475

0.021**
(0.010)
27.89
18513

0.030**
(0.012)
27.89
18513

0.027**
(0.012)
27.89
18504

0.003***
(0.001)
0.39
21475

0.003*
(0.002)
0.39
21475

0.004**
(0.002)
0.39
18513

0.005***
(0.001)
0.39
18513

0.004***
(0.001)
0.39
18504

0.008***
(0.001)
0.31
21475

-0.001
(0.001)
0.31
21475

-0.001
(0.001)
0.31
18513

-0.001
(0.002)
0.31
18513

-0.001
(0.002)
0.31
18504

Dependent mean
Observations

-0.010***
(0.001)
0.29
21475

-0.002*
(0.001)
0.29
21475

-0.003
(0.002)
0.29
18513

-0.004**
(0.002)
0.29
18513

-0.004**
(0.002)
0.29
18504

Individual FE
Year FE
State FE
Demographics
Region by Year FE
MxFLS1 Used as Exposure Location

Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Dependent mean
Observations
Overweight
Dependent mean
Observations
Obesity
Dependent mean
Observations
Normal weight

Note: All specifications include individual fixed effects. Demographics include age, marriage status,
education level, working status, household size, household monthly income. Errors are clustered at the
state level. Standard errors are displayed in parenthesis. *Coefficient is significant at 10% level.
**Coefficient is significant at 5% level. ***Coefficient is significant at 1% level.
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Table4 2.4. Military operations and fear of attack or assault
(1)
Fear of being attacked during day

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

0.006**
(0.002)
0.17
21449

0.007*
(0.003)
0.17
21449

0.007**
(0.003)
0.17
18491

0.005**
(0.002)
0.17
18491

0.005**
(0.002)
0.17
18486

0.004
(0.002)
0.21
21449

0.006*
(0.004)
0.21
21449

0.006
(0.004)
0.21
18491

0.005*
(0.003)
0.21
18491

0.004
(0.003)
0.21
18486

-0.014**
(0.006)
0.71
21449

-0.005
(0.006)
0.71
21449

-0.005
(0.005)
0.71
18491

-0.003
(0.004)
0.71
18491

-0.003
(0.004)
0.71
18486

Dependent mean
Observations

-0.001
(0.001)
0.12
21444

-0.004*
(0.002)
0.12
21444

-0.005**
(0.002)
0.13
18487

-0.006***
(0.002)
0.13
18487

-0.006***
(0.002)
0.13
18482

Individual FE
Year FE
State FE
Demographics
Region by Year FE
MxFLS1 Used as Exposure Location

Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Dependent mean
Observations
Fear of being attacked during night
Dependent mean
Observations
Safety compared to five years ago
Dependent mean
Observations
Going out at night frequently

Note: All specifications include individual fixed effects. Demographics include age, marriage status,
education level, working status, household size, household monthly income. Errors are clustered at the
state level. Standard errors are displayed in parenthesis. *Coefficient is significant at 10% level.
**Coefficient is significant at 5% level. ***Coefficient is significant at 1% level.
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Table52.5. Military operations and depression symptoms
(1)
Depression score

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.048
(0.063)
36.08
21365

0.234**
(0.085)
36.08
21365

0.209**
(0.095)
35.75
18420

0.258***
(0.061)
35.75
18420

0.251***
(0.061)
35.75
18415

-0.000
(0.001)
0.15
21365

0.003*
(0.001)
0.15
21365

0.001
(0.002)
0.15
18420

0.002
(0.001)
0.15
18420

0.002
(0.001)
0.15
18415

-0.001
(0.001)
0.20
21365

0.002
(0.002)
0.20
21365

0.002
(0.002)
0.19
18420

0.003*
(0.001)
0.19
18420

0.003
(0.002)
0.19
18415

-0.000
(0.001)
0.06
21365

0.001
(0.001)
0.06
21365

0.001
(0.001)
0.06
18420

0.000
(0.001)
0.06
18420

0.000
(0.001)
0.06
18415

Dependent mean
Observations

0.002
(0.002)
0.59
21365

-0.006**
(0.002)
0.59
21365

-0.004*
(0.002)
0.60
18420

-0.005***
(0.002)
0.60
18420

-0.005**
(0.002)
0.60
18415

Individual FE
Year FE
State FE
Demographics
Region by Year FE
MxFLS1 Used as Exposure Location

Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Dependent mean
Observations
Mild depression
Dependent mean
Observations
Moderate depression
Dependent mean
Observations
Severe depression
Dependent mean
Observations
No depression

Note: All specifications include individual fixed effects. Demographics include age, marriage status,
education level, working status, household size, household monthly income. Errors are clustered at the
state level. Standard errors are displayed in parenthesis. *Coefficient is significant at 10% level.
**Coefficient is significant at 5% level. ***Coefficient is significant at 1% level.
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Table62.6. Military operations and food expenses
(1)
Home food

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

5.079
(5.226)
47.73
10800

4.411
(5.569)
47.73
10800

5.513
(6.268)
47.78
10782

0.822
(2.177)
47.78
10782

0.777
(2.276)
47.78
10775

3.271
(3.266)
25.83
10802

3.028
(3.420)
25.83
10802

3.752
(3.895)
25.86
10784

0.714
(1.192)
25.86
10784

0.766
(1.217)
25.85
10777

1.808
(1.989)
21.90
10801

1.383
(2.178)
21.90
10801

1.761
(2.403)
21.92
10783

0.108
(1.026)
21.92
10783

0.011
(1.094)
21.92
10776

Dependent mean
Observations

0.583
(0.576)
2.68
10695

1.028
(0.783)
2.68
10695

1.146
(0.848)
2.68
10677

0.340
(0.237)
2.68
10677

0.363
(0.243)
2.69
10670

Individual FE
Year FE
State FE
Demographics
Region by Year FE
MxFLS1 Used as Exposure Location

Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Dependent mean
Observations
High calories items
Dependent mean
Observations
Low calories items
Dependent mean
Observations
Out of home food

Note: All specifications include individual fixed effects. Demographics include age, marriage status, education
level, working status, household size, household monthly income. Errors are clustered at the state level. Standard
errors are displayed in parenthesis. *Coefficient is significant at 10% level. **Coefficient is significant at 5%
level. ***Coefficient is significant at 1% level.
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Table72.7. Military operations and physical activity
(1)
Exercise

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

-0.000
(0.001)
0.15
21383

-0.002
(0.003)
0.15
21383

-0.001
(0.003)
0.15
18433

-0.001
(0.003)
0.15
18433

-0.001
(0.003)
0.15
18428

Dependent mean
Observations

-0.039*
(0.020)
0.95
21383

-0.034
(0.028)
0.95
21383

-0.037
(0.030)
0.99
18433

-0.013
(0.020)
0.99
18433

-0.015
(0.020)
0.99
18428

Year FE
State FE
Demographics
Region by Year FE
MxFLS1 Used as Exposure Location

No
No
No
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
No

Dependent mean
Observations
Exercise (weekly hours)

Note: All specifications include individual fixed effects. Demographics include age, marriage status, education
level, working status, household size, household monthly income. Errors are clustered at the state level. Standard
errors are displayed in parenthesis. *Coefficient is significant at 10% level. **Coefficient is significant at 5%
level. ***Coefficient is significant at 1% level.
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Table82.8. Geographic regions
Region

South-Southeast
Center-west
Center
Northeast
Northwest

States

Campeche, Yucatán, Chiapas, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo,
Tabasco, Guerrero, and Veracruz.
Jalisco, Michoacán, Colima, Aguascalientes, Nayarit,
Zacatecas, San Luis Potosí and Guanajuato.
Ciudad de Mexico, Querétaro, Hidalgo, Tlaxcala, Puebla,
Morelos and Estado de México.
Tamaulipas, Nuevo León, Coahuila, Chihuahua y Durango.
Baja California, Baja California Sur, Sonora and Sinaloa.

Note: This division originates in the 2006 Mexican National Development Plan, is
intended to help coordinating national projects and was the one considered by MxFLS
to do the sampling process. According to such division some states can belong to two
regions: Puebla can belong to either the Center or South-Southeast, Chihuahua and
Durango to the Northeast or Northwest, and Queretaro to the Center or Centerwest
region. To avoid overlapping regions when creating Region by Year fixed effects either
possibility is considered in alternative cases like the one outlined in this table.
Source: Mexican Family Life Survey Users Guide and 2006 Mexican National
Development Plan.

Table92.9. Food expenditures categories
Categories

Home food
Low caloric
Fruits/Vegetables (non-starchy)
Poultry and seafood
Unrefined carbohydrates
High caloric
Refined carbohydrates
Red meat
Fats and oils
High in sugar and fat

Out of home food

MxFLS survey items included

Bananas, apples, oranges, other fruits, onions, red
tomatoes, chiles, and other vegetables.
Chicken, chicken eggs, tuna/sardines, and fish/seafood.
Potatoes, milk, legumes, beans, rice, and other cereals.
Corn tortillas, bread/baguette, soup/pasta, cheese, and
other dairy products.
Beef, pork, and other animal products.
Vegetable oil.
Sodas; beverage juices, purified water, beverages as
beer tequila rum and powder for preparing water;
cookies; white sugar; coffee; other industrial/packaged
products like pancakes, candies, potato chips, etc.
Meals outside of the household.

Note: Caloric content was determined based on Chávez et al. (2010).
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Table102.10. Variables description
Name

Description

Military
eradications
Military
interceptions

Military
operations
targeting
drug
fields.
Source: SEDENA.
Military operations targeting drug-related traffic through land vehicle checkpoints and
surveillance
stations
that
focus
on
air
and
water
routes.
Source: SEDENA.

Homicide
rates
Body Mass
Index (BMI)

Number of homicides adjusted by population size multiplied by 10,000.
Source: INEGI.
BMI is obtained by dividing individual measures of individual weight by the square of
the corresponding height, where weight is expressed in kilograms and height in meters.
Source: MxFLS.

Overweight
(30>BMI≥25)

Overweight is an individual measure taking the value of one if BMI is greater or equal to
25 and less than 30, and zero otherwise.
Source: MxFLS.

Obesity
(BMI≥30)

Overweight is an individual measure taking the value of one if BMI is greater or equal to
30
and
zero
otherwise.
Source: MxFLS.

High caloric
food expenses

High caloric food expenses consist of household purchases of high calorically dense
food items adjusted by number of household members. a
Source: MxFLS.

Low caloric
food expenses

Low caloric food expenses consist of household purchases of low calorically dense food
items adjusted by number of household members. a
Source: MxFLS.

Outside of
home meals
expenses

Outside of home meals expenses consists of household purchases of meals out of home
adjusted by number of household members.a
Source: MxFLS.

Exercise
activity

Exercise activity refers to an individual binary indicator that takes the value of one if the
individual reports doing exercise on the week before the interview took place and zero
otherwise.
Source: MxFLS.

a

Table 2.10 lists food items available from MxFLS grouped by each category considered. Household
expenses refer to purchases performed on different specific food items the week before the interview took
place. For cases where last week purchases are not available purchases from last month are used.
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3 Will Violent Crime Incentivize the Hiding of Small Firms?
3.1 Introduction
Does exposure to violent crime increase firm informality?

While arguably an important

question, to my knowledge it has not been yet addressed. This is remarkable given that in many
developing countries the size of the underground economy is rather large and as such constitutes
a pressing problem. As an example, underground economy represents around forty-five percent
of the gross domestic product and more than seventy percent of the labor force in Latin America
(Loayza et al., 2009). It is clear that a better understanding of key informality drivers is needed in
order to better design policies to deal with this issue.
In this research I focus on the case of Mexico and take advantage of its notorious increase
in violent crime in the context of the country’s “war on drugs,” a conflict between the
government and the drug trafficking organizations that began in 2006 and created large
variations in violence intensity. In addition, to address potential endogeneity concerns due to
self-selection I rely on the literature that links weather and violent crime (Carleton and Hsiang,
2016). I employ temperature as an instrument that adequately complies with the exclusion
restriction by focusing on non-agricultural firms and accounting for seasonal variations.
Interestingly, any observed causal link from violent crime exposure to increases in
informality might signify that firms willing to become formal are in fact discouraged to do so by
reasons that are beyond the typical determinants of informality currently in the literature, such as
tax and regulation burden, financial market development, and the quality of the legal system
(Inchauste et al., 2005). Becoming or staying informal to these firms can be costly in both
additional effort and loss of resources in order to go underground as well as to avoid being
uncovered and singled out by criminals. In fact, firm profits in Mexico have decreased during the
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war on drugs period, which is directly attributed to violent crime. For instance, this is the case of
local businesses such as gas stations, drugstores, and professional offices, including medical
doctors and lawyers, as they tend to shorten operating hours in order to reduce exposure to
violence25. Similarly, the tourism industry, which is particularly large in the country, has shown a
drastic decline in activity in locations known to be violent as well as in locations linked to roads
where criminal activity is known to occur26. Furthermore, the fact that criminal organizations
tend to charge firms with quotas or implicit taxes only tends to compound this problem27.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the data. Section 3 presents
the empirical methodology. Section 4 presents the main findings. Section 5 concludes.

3.2 Data
The data come from three main publicly available sources. First, I draw quarterly individual
information on businesses, including informality, from the National Survey on Employment and
Occupation (ENOE), which is the primary source of labor force statistics in the country. It is a
rotating panel survey where individuals are interviewed for five consecutive quarters and then
replaced. Second, I collect data on homicide rates by quarter and municipality from official
reports provided by the National Statistical Agency (INEGI). Finally, I use temperature averages
by quarter and state from the National Water Commission (CONAGUA). Matching all available
data allows us to study the period from 2005 to 2016.
The definition of informality employed is the same used by INEGI. Informal businesses
are those firms owned by household’s members that are not constituted as separate legal entities,
lack complete accounts that permit a financial separation of their production activities, and/or are
not registered under specific forms of national legislation, including tax or social security laws.
25

http://www.excelsior.com.mx/2012/08/13/nacional/853135
http://archivo.eluniversal.com.mx/estados/85953.html.
27
https://www.proceso.com.mx/290237/para-pagar-cuota-al-narco-suben-kilo-de-tortilla-en-michoacan
26
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The details on how the informality variable is constructed as well as the rest of variables in this
paper is provided in Table 3.1.

3.3 Empirical Strategy
I focus on employers and self-employed individuals from the private sector who are sampled for
the full five quarters of the corresponding rotating panel using information related to their main
job28. My sample excludes those employed in the agriculture sector and those who are domestic
employees. I focus on actively working individuals, as I am interested in tax registration shifts of
ongoing businesses29. My set of controls includes demographic controls such as age, sex, years
of education, as well as income level. In addition, I include municipal, quarter, and year fixed
effects. The dependent variable is a dummy that reflects the informal status of the firm. As such,
I employ a linear probability approach with the following reduced form:
𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑞 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑥𝑚𝑡𝑞 + 𝛾𝑚 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜂𝑞 + 𝜖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑞 ,

(1)

where 𝑦𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑞 is the informality status associated with firm 𝑖 in municipality 𝑚 at year 𝑡 in quarter
𝑞, 𝑥𝑚𝑡𝑞 is the homicide rate (per 10,000) in municipality 𝑚 at year 𝑡 and quarter 𝑞, 𝜂𝑡 stands for
year fixed effects and 𝜂𝑞 stands for quarter fixed effects and 𝜖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑞 is the error term. The
informality status takes a value of one if the firm is regarded as informal and zero otherwise. I
use homicide rates per 10,000 as the explanatory variable. In addition, I correct for the lack of
independent variation in homicide rates within municipalities clustering errors at this level. I
alternatively include state-year fixed effects to allow for different trends at the subnational level
and individual fixed effects to control for individual heterogeneity.

28

By doing this, I exclude heads of firms that were unemployed, turned into employees or for some reason, were not
interviewed.
29
ENOE follows heads of firms, not firms themselves.

31

I further explore endogeneity concerns by instrumenting homicide rates using
temperature, where the exclusion restriction assumes that variations in temperature do not
directly affect the incentives to switch registration status after controlling for time fixed effects
that account for seasonal and annual variations in weather. As outlined above, individuals
pertaining to the agriculture sector are excluded from the analysis, further ensuring the
instrument validity. This identification strategy also relies on the assumption that quarterly
variations in weather changes on average do not differ significantly across municipalities within
a state in a quarter.

3.4. Findings
The main results correspond to the sample consisting of business heads, i.e. employers and selfemployed individuals observed for the full five quarters of the rotating panel. The first three
columns in Table 3.2 show the linear probability model (LPM) results, which point that on
average an additional homicide per 10,000 people each quarter increases the probability to be
informal by in between 0.6 percent and 1.1 percent30. The last three columns in Table 3.2 show
the results from the second stage least squares from the instrumental variables (IV) approach
using temperature as an instrument, which indicate that such change corresponds to an increase
between 13.7 percent and 17.3 percent in the probability to be informal.

Common to IV

findings, these estimations yield larger coefficients, which is likely the result of the fact that they
measure LATE impacts. All results presented include sampling weights.31
Table 3.3 shows that my estimates are robust to changes in the way I treat formality and
informality. In particular, I explore whether results are sensitive to dropping firms that show

30

Probits yield virtually identical results.
Specifications without sampling weights display similar results although the coefficients are slightly smaller.
Since ENOE does not sample all municipalities each quarter, using sampling weights accounts for
underrepresentation that may miss to capture variations in homicides.
31
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consecutive changes in registration status during any of the five quarters that the firm is followed
in the rotating panel. Since switches from and to formal registration status of a firm are not
costless, one might argue that these quarterly changes could be due to potential
misclassifications32. Panel A in Table 3.3 excludes firms showing at most one formal-informal
registration switch in any of the five quarters of the rotating panel. Similarly, Panel B in the same
table excludes firms showing one or more of such formal-informal registration switches. I
observe that the findings in Table 3.3 are analogous to the one presented in Table 3.233.

3.5. Conclusions
I find that exposure to violent crime promotes informality. On average an additional homicide
per 10,000 people each quarter increases the probability to be informal between 0.6 percentage
points and 1.1 percentage points. These results are further corroborated when using an
instrumental variables approach that is consistent with the exclusion restriction, which indicates
that these estimates range between 13.7 percentage points and 17.3 percentage points.
It appears that exposure to violent crime increases the opportunity costs of informality as
losses and spending on security measures may otherwise be used to afford formality. An
additional mechanism at work may be fear. Owners may prefer to stay underground or reduce
working hours in order to reduce exposure to violence. Finally, these findings help inform
policymakers on the potential benefits that reducing violent crime can have in terms of
incorporating firms into the regulated sector and thus increasing the tax base.
32

Becoming informal restricts business networks due to unavailability of invoices and access to the financial
system. Becoming formal, besides the paper work and tax payments implied, may be a risky move as it discloses the
firm’s existence.
33
Results are robust to including those that are interviewed less than five times in the rotating panel. In addition, I
also pursue additional robustness tests by employing alternative definitions of informality different from the official
ones employed by INEGI. When using a definition based social security registration status, I find slightly less
statistically significant results, which is reasonable, as firm owners do not necessarily act as workers in their own
business. These findings are available upon request. Including individual fixed effects shows similar results for the
LPM but the IV approach is not significant.

33

Table113.1 Description of Variables
Variable

Definition

Firm Informality

Informality status based on ENOE’s questions 4C-4D, 4E, and 4G as
defined by INEGI. 4C and 4D classify a firm by means of its official
name. 4E is “business or activity, a) has an establishment and office, b)
has only an office, c) has only an establishment, d) does not have an office
or establishment.” 4G is “In this business or activity, a) do you use the
services of an accountant to keep records? b) do you only use a notebook
or write personal notes to keep accounting records? c) do you use an
income booklet or do you have a cash register from the Ministry of
Finance for small taxpayers? d) you do not keep any accounting records.”
If 4C and 4D identify the business as complex, informality equals 0. If not
complex and 4E is a), b) or c), the value depends on 4G: informality is 1 if
4G is b) or d) and is 0 if it is a) or c). If not complex but 4E is d) then
informality is 1. Source: ENOE (2005-2016).

Worker Informality

Informality based on social security status using question Q6D from
ENOE: “Due to this job, do you have access to health services through: a)
IMSS, b) ISSSTE, c) state ISSSTE, d) other institution, e) none.” Variable
equals one if response is (a) and 0 otherwise. IMSS refers to social
security of private sector; ISSSTE refers to that of public sector. Source:
ENOE (2005-2016).

Age

Age in years. Source: ENOE (2005-2016)

Sex

Binary variable taking the value of 1 if female and 0 if male. Source:
ENOE from 2005 to 2016.

Education

Years of education based on the last academic degree reported by the
individual. Source: ENOE from 2005 to 2016.

Income

Reported monthly income. Source: ENOE from 2005 to 2016.

Homicide rate

Number of homicides per quarter and municipality divided by population
size multiplied by 10,000. Source: INEGI (2005, 2016) and CONAPO
(2005, 2010).

Temperature

State and quarterly average temperature in Celsius. Source: NWC (2005,
2016)
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Table123.2. Violent Crime and Informality
LPM

IV 2SLS

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.011***

0.009***

0.006***

0.156***

0.137***

0.173*

(0.003)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.051)

(0.044)

(0.102)

Year FE

X

X

X

X

X

X

Quarter FE

X

X

X

X

X

X

Municipality FE

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Homicide rate

Demographics
State by year FE

X

X

Weak instruments KP Statistic

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

41.08

41.02

16.95

10% maximal size critical value

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

16.38

16.38

16.38

Observations
482761
482640
482640
482761
482640
482640
CEOs surveyed at least one time. Sample period corresponds to 2005-2016 and frequency of all variables is
quarterly. Informality data corresponds to the individual level, homicides to the municipal level and weather data to
the state level. Homicide rates are in per capita terms (per 10,000). Each column represents a different regression.
Dependent variable mean is 0.64. Standard errors in parenthesis. All specifications include sampling weights.
Demographic controls include age, sex, years of education and income level. Errors are clustered at the municipal
level. *Coefficient is significant at 10% level. **Coefficient is significant at 5% level. ***Coefficient is significant
at 1% level.
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Table133.3. Robustness Tests
LPM

IV 2SLS

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

0.010***

0.009***

0.006**

0.155***

0.139***

0.188*

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.054)

(0.047)

(0.110)

Weak instruments KP Statistic

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

36.15

36.09

16.43

10% maximal size critical value

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

16.38

16.38

16.38

391901

391806

391806

391901

391806

391806

0.011***

0.010***

0.005**

0.156***

0.141***

0.178

(0.003)

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.055)

(0.048)

(0.113)

Dep. Variable mean

0.68

0.68

0.68

0.68

0.68

0.68

Weak instruments KP Statistic

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

37.32

37.27

15.36

10% maximal size critical value

n.a.

n.a.

n.a.

16.38

16.38

16.38

374462

374372

374372

374462

374372

374372

Year FE

X

X

X

X

X

X

Quarter FE

X

X

X

X

X

X

Municipality FE

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Panel A
Homicide rate

Observations
Panel B
Homicide rate

Observations

Demographics

State by year FE
X
X
Sample period is 2005-2016 and frequency of all variables is quarterly. Informality data correspond to the individual
level, homicides to the municipal level and weather data to the state level. Homicide rates are in per capita terms (per
10,000). Standard errors are in parenthesis. All specifications include sampling weights. Demographic controls: age,
sex, years of education and income level. Errors are clustered at the municipal level. Panel A excludes individuals
where changes do not last more than a quarter but there is at most one such pattern along the five quarters. Panel B
excludes individuals where changes do not last more than a quarter and there is one or more such patterns along the
five quarters. Dependent variable mean is 0.67. *Coefficient is significant at 10% level. **Coefficient is significant at
5% level. ***Coefficient is significant at 1% level.
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Table143.4. First Stages
(1)

(2)

(3)

0.0169***

0.0169***

0.0073*

(0.0053)

(0.0053)

(0.0041)

Year FE

X

X

X

Quarter FE

X

X

X

Municipality FE

X

X

X

X

X

482640

482640

Temperature

Demographics
State by year FE
Observations

X
482761

Sample period is 2005-2016 and frequency of all variables is quarterly. Informality data corresponds
to the individual level, homicides to the municipal level and weather data to the state level. Homicide
rates are in per capita terms (per 10,000). Dependent variable mean is 0.64. Standard errors in
parenthesis. All specifications include sampling weights. Demographic controls include age, sex,
years of education and income level. Errors are clustered at the municipal level. *Coefficient is
significant at 10% level. **Coefficient is significant at 5% level. ***Coefficient is significant at 1%
level.
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4 Fighting Against Hunger: A Country-Wide Intervention and its
Impact on Birth Outcomes
4.1 Introduction
Despite being a thriving emerging economy, Mexico experiences an unbalanced distribution of
wealth. This affects more than 53 million people who live below the national poverty line, which
accounts for 44% of the total population (CONEVAL, 2016a). While stunting and anemia have
declined in Mexico, undernutrition is still prevalent in several regions (Kroker-Lobos et al.,
2014). Food poverty alone, defined as not having enough income to purchase the basic basket of
goods, affects 24.6 million people in Mexico, equivalent to 20.1% of the total population
(CONEVAL, 2016b).34 All at once, overweight and obesity have increased rapidly among all age
groups (Kroker-Lobos et al., 2014). The joint problem of undernutrition and obesity has
motivated social assistance programs that not only provide food but that aim to improve
nutrition, especially among infants. In Mexico, out of 40 million children and adolescents living
in Mexico, more than half of them lives in poverty (UNICEF, 2018). This is particularly
worrying as having a disadvantaged socioeconomic status has negative health and human capital
implications that carry through into adulthood (Currie, 2009).
Most recently, in 2013, the Mexican government set in motion a large national
intervention named Sin Hambre (SH) (DOFa, 2013). 35 SH was a broad targeting and
coordination strategy involving a large set of programs from several ministries aiming to fight
hunger (Alderman et al., 2017). This was the flagship assistance policy in Mexico from 2013 to
2018 and it has been one of the most important large-scale food assistance policies implemented
34

Food poverty as defined by CONEVAL refers to not having enough income to purchase the basic basket of goods.
The program was also known as Cruzada Nacional contra el Hambre (CNCH) and can be literally translated as
National Crusade Against Hunger. Sin Hambre can be translated as No Hunger.
35
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in recent years in Mexico and Latin America. The scope of SH was ambitious as it involved
more than 30 programs and represented average annual expenditures of around 1% of Mexico’s
GDP from 2013 to 2017 (ASF, various years). 36 This is a considerable sum compared to the
7.5% spent in public social expenditures in the same period in Mexico (OCDE, 2019). 37
Importantly, SH added new important programs that sought to improve nutrition intake of
recipients: PAL-Sin Hambre (PAL-SH) and Comedores Comunitarios (CC) (ASF, various years;
Alderman et al., 2017). PAL-SH constituted a switch from a former cash transfer into a transfer
delivered utilizing a prepaid card which is restricted to designated grocery stores and specific
food items, while CC consisted of the inception of several many feeding stations that provided
meals at discounted prices. Internal evaluations by the government indicate that food and health
access improved following SH, both for treated individuals and municipalities, CONEVAL
(2015).38 These evaluations, however, ignore health related outcomes and do not account for
time trends.39 Overall, there are no studies on the impact of SH on health-related outcomes at the
national level. To my knowledge, there is only one related study that analyses the impact of CC
at the local level. This work finds evidence that weight for height and high for weight measures
for children under five years old improve in response to CC, one component of SH (Natalie et
al., 2018). The study, however, is limited as it only focuses on CC, does it for a small sample
from a single state, and does not account for time trends as there is no control group.

36

Information obtained from reports issued by the Auditoria Superior de la Federacion (ASF) from 2013 to 2017.
ASF is the national organization in charge of auditing governmental organizations in Mexico.
37
Public social expenditure comprises cash benefits, direct in-kind provision of goods and services, and tax breaks
with social purposes. It excludes social benefits not provided by general government.
38
CONEVAL (2015) consists of two reports: the first refers to a panel survey conducted at the household on treated
individuals while the second focuses on the aggregated results of five municipalities exposed to SH.
39
Other studies available are mostly qualitative and focus on analyzing SH in terms of its design and
implementation. Some examples of this research can be found in Caro et al. (2018), Martinez et al. (2016), or Gil et
al. (2014).
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Estimating the impact of SH in terms of birthweight seems a natural first stage
assessment. Birthweight is known as the single most important indicator of infant health. Plus,
infants are among the most vulnerable groups to hunger. Moreover, an established literature
identifies that low weight at birth affects health during childhood and adulthood as well as
human capital accumulation.40 The need to investigate the impact of SH on birthweight is further
motivated by the fact that eliminating infant malnutrition was one of the main objectives of SH.
This paper estimates the impact of mother’s exposure to SH on birth weight and the incidence of
Low Birth Weight (LBW), which refers to births weighting less than 2,500 grams, of her child
using vital statistics data on birth records. My identification strategy exploits the regional
variation and timing of the municipality-by-municipality rollout of the nationwide program SH
using a multiperiod difference-in-difference matching estimator as proposed by Imai, Kim, and
Wang (2019).41 This methodology pertains to recent literature that emphasizes that regression
models with time and unit fixed effects are typically biased under the parallel trend assumption
when units are treated at different points in time (Imai & Kim, 2011; Borusyak and Jaravel,
2017; Abraham and Sun, 2018; Athey and Imbens, 2018; Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille,
2018; Goodman-Bacon, 2018). In a nutshell, the proposed methodological framework first
selects a set of matched control units for each treated unit that on average is similar to the treated
unit in terms of its outcome and covariate histories. Then it applies a difference-in-difference
estimator to each treated unit and its synthetic control unit to adjust for unobserved time trends.
Finally, it averages of all such differences.

40

Pregnant women are among the most vulnerable groups to malnutrition. Each year around 20 million babies are
born underweight (Fanzo et al., 2018).
41
The matching method is available via the open-source statistical software, PanelMatch: Matching Methods for
Causal Inference with Time-Series Cross-Sectional Data, at https://github.com/insongkim/PanelMatch.
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The methodology chosen is ideal to evaluate the impact of SH due to its particular
staggered rollout. 42 First, Imai, Kim, and Wang (2019) simplify the analysis of data where
several units receive treatment multiple times and timing differs across units, which is the case of
SH rollout.43 Similar methodologies merely allow to study cases where one single unit is treated,
require a large number of units not receiving the treatment at all, or entail complex modeling for
each time period (Abadie et al., 2010; Arkhangelsky et al., 2018; Xu, 2017; Imai and Tatkovic,
2015). Second, this matching methodology allows estimating causal effects by synthetically
constructing control units that suffice the parallel trend assumption. This is especially important
in the context of SH as the order in which municipalities were treated was not randomly chosen
and so estimates could be biased. As further explained in the next sections, the poorest
municipalities were treated first followed by the next poorest. It is important to notice that poorer
municipalities could derive larger benefits if health at the bottom of the income distribution
exerts larger benefits (Deaton, 2003). Similarly, poorer municipalities could derive smaller
benefits due to a lower income and availability of services. The design of the program thus
makes its evaluation challenging. By comparing each treated unit to a control unit built to be
similar to the treated observation in terms of outcome and covariate histories this methodology
can provide a causal and unbiased estimate. Third, this method accounts for post-treatment bias
since future treatments may be caused by past treatments, something present in SH due to its
staggered design and for which other methodologies require complex modeling. Lastly, this
methodology allows computing model-based standard errors for estimates in a noncomputationally intensive way. See Imai, Kim, and Wang (2019) for a detailed literature review
on alternative methods and their limitations depending on the application context. In addition to
42

The methodology is described in more detail in the next sections.
This process can be considered a generalization of the synthetic control method proposed by Abadie et al. (2010)
in which only one unit receives the treatment.
43
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the multiperiod difference-in-difference methodology mentioned above I use various other linear
regression identification strategies as robustness checks.
My main results indicate that exposure to the program has a moderate impact on
birthweight and LBW at best. Overall, I observe mixed evidence across specifications, with
estimates leaning towards optimistic yet small effects. While some estimates are pessimistic,
none of these are significant, nor economically or statistically. My preferred specification, using
the propensity score weighting matching methodology, shows that SH reduces the fraction of
LBW births by 0.1 percentage points. Although statistically insignificant, this estimate is
economically relevant as it represents a decrease of 2.3% with respect to the mean value. In
terms of birthweight in grams, under this same specification the impact of SH appears to be
insignificant both economically and statistically as it represents a decrease of 0.4 grams which
corresponds to a decrease of 0.01% with respect to the mean value. While the propensity score
weighting methodology provides the best covariate balance, estimates from some refining
methodologies are more optimistic. Overall, results indicate that SH reduces the fraction of LBW
by at most 0.4 percentage points (6.7% with respect to the mean value) and increases birthweight
in grams by at most 6 grams (0.19% with respect to the mean).
Studying the effect of the program on individuals considered as income eligible to social
programs indicate larger impacts for some but not all specifications. In particular, the effects
corresponding to the propensity score weighting methodology do show a reduction of 0.6
percentage points in the fraction of LBW (10.5% with respect to the mean value) and an increase
of 9.2 grams in birthweight (0.29% with respect to the mean value). Estimating the impact of SH
up to two years after the first year of exposure shows some evidence of longer-term benefits in
line with contemporaneous impacts. Using alternative identification strategies that consist of
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triple difference in differences approaches that compare eligible to non-eligible individuals in
treated municipalities against untreated municipalities yield estimates in line with the main
results, there are beneficial impacts, but these are not observed across all specifications.
Estimates may be driven by compositional effects associated with fertility. In this regard, while
estimates for fertility rates show mix evidence, they overall show a reduction in response to the
program. Such results could be due to conditions in the treated municipalities that reduce fertility
rates and incentivize investments per child (Rosenzweig et al., 2009).
My work makes contributions in various regards. First, I am the first to evaluate the
impact of SH in terms of birthweight and to provide an external evaluation of the program in
terms of health outcomes. Second, I add to the literature on the impact of assistance policies on
birthweight for large food assistance programs in developing contexts. Third, I provide one of
the firsts practical applications of the matching method proposed by Imai, Kim and, Wang
(2019) to a social program.

4.2 Sin Hambre program
SH was a broad coordination and targeting strategy launched in 2013 in Mexico that involved a
large set of new and existing programs from several ministries. While SH involved several
programs created in former administrations like Seguro Popular (SP), the universal health
insurance policy, and Prospera (PDHO), the conditional on school attendance cash transfer, it
also introduced new important programs that aimed to improve the nutrition intake of recipients
like PAL-Sin Hambre (PAL-SH) and Comedores Comunitarios (CC) (ASF, various years;
Alderman et al., 2017). PAL-SH constituted a switch from a former cash transfer into a transfer
delivered by means of a prepaid card which is restricted to designated grocery stores and specific
food items, while CC consisted of the inception of several many feeding stations providing meals
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at discounted prices (DOF, 2013b; SEDESOL, 2013a). While the original SH act included
around 70 programs, this number decreased to 30 programs in later years (ASF, various years).
In practice, according to government reports of SH on its attainments in terms of coverage, the
main programs were the following: CC, LICONSA, PAL, PAL-SH, PAR, PCS, PDHO, PESA,
PETC, PROCAMPO and SP. The Appendix A1 provides a summary with the description of each
of these programs.44
SH is a food assistance policy that was rollout nationally in three stages, assigning a set
of municipalities to each stage depending on the relative prevalence of poverty and food
insecurity eventually covering all municipalities (DOF, 2013a). SH treated the most underserved
municipalities in 2013, the next in 2014 and the rest in 2016. Following this staged strategy,
PAL-SH and CC were introduced in selected municipalities while formerly existing programs
like were mandated to prioritize their activities either increasing coverage or simply giving
preference to eligible individuals from selected municipalities (DOF, 2013a). PAL-SH
constitutes a switch from a former cash transfer into a transfer delivered by means of a prepaid
card that is only usable in designated grocery stores and on selected food items (DOF, 2013b).
CC consists of the inception of several many feeding stations providing meals for free or at
subsidized prices to specific groups including pregnant women (SEDESOL, 2013a). Figure 2.1
shows the geographical distribution of treatment across municipalities and years. Details on the
selection process are provided in Appendix A2.

44

Given that each administration rebrands and modifies previous programs the acronyms and names provided might
differ across time. Unless otherwise indicated, I use the names and acronyms corresponding to the period from 2000
to 2012 prior to the introduction of SH.)
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SH was implemented in municipalities according to stages defined in federal rules. 45 In
January of 2013, the passage of an act announced a first stage covering 400 municipalities in
2013 (SEDESOL, 2013b). In January of 2014, an amendment to the prior act announced a
second stage covering 612 municipalities in 2014 and anticipated a third stage to occur in 2015
covering the rest of the municipalities (SEDESOL, 2014). By the time the first stage was
announced second, and third stages were unanticipated. In practice, according to rollout
information obtained directly from SEDESOL, the third stage was also unanticipated to
recipients as it was postponed and started until 2016.46 SH assigned municipalities to each stage
depending on the relative prevalence of poverty and food insecurity essentially treating the most
underserved set of municipalities in 2013, the next in 2014 and the rest in 2016. In the following
paragraphs I describe the procedure followed by SEDESOL, the original documents detailing the
procedure are referenced as SEDESOL (2013b) and SEDESOL (2014).
To determine eligibility into each stage, municipalities were ranked in descending order,
those most underserved on top, based on four indexes measuring poverty and food insecurity
based on information from the 2010 Census and the 2010 MCS-ENIGH, a module from the
national income and expenditures survey. 47 The indexes used to rank municipalities were the
following: the proportion of people under extreme poverty (P%), absolute number of people
under extreme poverty (P#), proportion of people under both extreme poverty and food
insecurity (PI%), and absolute number of people under both extreme poverty and food insecurity
(PI#). These rankings were then used to establish thresholds that separated a stage from each

45

Social assistance programs in Mexico are both funded and coordinated federally. This means that it is not up to
the authority of local areas, in this case municipalities, when to start.
46
The fact that the third stage started in 2016 comes from the rollout information obtained via request to SEDESOL.
47
MCS-ENIGH refers to the Socioeconomic Conditions Module (MCS- Módulo de Condiciones Socioeconómicas)
from the National Household Expenditure and Income Survey (ENIGH-Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos en
los Hogares).
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other in order to roughly include 50% of the objective population during the first stage and an
additional 25% by the second stage. The objective population amounted to 7.4 million people
across the country, roughly 5% of the total population, SEDESOL (2013b). The corresponding
assignment resulted in a first stage assisting 400 municipalities starting in 2013, and a second
stage assisting the first stage plus 612 additional municipalities starting in 2014, and a third stage
assisting former and remaining municipalities starting in 2016.48 While most municipalities were
selected based on these rankings several were chosen using more discrete rules. 49 According
government reports, from 2013 to the first months of 2015, PAL-SH and CC, the main and new
components, incorporated approximately 731 thousand families and 627 thousand beneficiaries,
respectively, (PRESIDENCIA, 2015). Considering an average family of four individuals, which
roughly corresponds to the household population divided by the total households, only
considering PAL-SH a conservative estimate of the number of individuals treated lies around 3
million, roughly 2.5% of the total population.50 A lower bound considering that individuals can
enroll into multiple programs at once, and formerly created programs also enrolled more people
as part of SH strategy. For instance, during the implementation of SH, LICONSA added 2.6
million beneficiaries while PDHO added 728 thousand families (PRESIDENCIA, 2015).

4.3 “Sin Hambre” and birthweight
Birthweight is known to be strongly associated with socio-economic factors (De Bernabé et al.,
2004; Kramer, 1987; Cnattingius, 2004). At large, SH programs as described in the previous
section consist of monetary transfers, in-kind transfers, discount prices, training plans, and health
services. These programs are expected to affect birthweight by promoting nutrition intake.
48

The number of municipalities in 2013, when the selection process was made, was 2,456. As of 2018, the number
of municipalities is 2,458.
49
There were 128 municipalities chosen based on such other considerations, 19 for the first and 119 for second
stage.
50
Formerly created programs, also increased the number of beneficiaries,
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Similarly, other programs may have an indirect impact on birthweight as they provide health
services and improve socioeconomic conditions of women in reproductive age in general. 51
Diverse components therefore may impact birth related outcomes due to exposure during and
prior to pregnancy.
PAL-SH and CC, the new components introduced by SH, are particularly important since
birthweight is widely known to be positively related to malnutrition during and prior to
pregnancy (Verma et al., 2019). PAL-SH, which is a switch from its former version PAL,
essentially rotates the budget set away from non-selected food items and expands it towards
these items. CC, on the other hand, expands the budget set towards the food items included in
meals provided. The extent to which these components drive results will depend on the number
of recipients as well as other considerations. First, if households affected by PAL-SH and CC are
majorly extramarginal, effects arising from PAL-SH and CC on this groups would be larger.52
This is something likely as eligibility to PAL-SH and CC requires satisfying means tests that
target low income households. 53 Second, PAL-SH and CC can potentially reduce maternal
obesity and its negative consequences on newborns, including reducing larger than usual birth
weight occurrences potentially having a negative effect on birthweight.54 Although this second
point is less likely, food assistance programs in developed settings have shown that buying food
unrestrainedly leads to obesity in general (DeBono et al., 2012, Golan et al., 2008).

51

For a detailed review on the medical literature about the determinants of birth weight and how transfers can affect
it see Almond (2011).
52
Households can be regarded as inframarginal or extramarginal depending on whether the in-kind food assistance
exceed regular food expenditures. Households are inframarginal if food expenditures are above the allotment
provided, in which case program functions as an unrestricted transfer. Households are extramarginal if the allotment
is below regular food expenditures.
53
Means tests prevents tagging as eligibility depends on several characteristics hard to manipulate together.
54
Evidence shows that exposure to maternal obesity is a strong predictor for large for gestational age status (LGA),
gestational diabetes, among other congenital anomalies (Boney et al., 2005; Leddy et al., 2008, Blomberg et al.,
2010). Large for gestational age (LGA) is an indication of weight above the usual amount for the number of weeks
of pregnancy that lies above the 90th percentile for that gestational age.
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4.4 Data
My main data set refers to the effective rollout by year and municipality of SH. This was
obtained via direct request from SEDESOL.55 The data obtained provides different enrollment
measures for all programs considered by SEDESOL to be associated with the strategy of SH. A
municipality is treated if it has access to any of the programs part of SH. My primary data source
for the outcome variables consists of vital statistics information on all birth records, a nationwide
publicly available dataset administered by the Ministry of Health in Mexico. With around 2
million births per year, vital statistics observations allow to precisely estimate effects from SH.
My main sample consists of women ages 18 to 44, from calendar years 2008 to 2017. I select
2008 as this is the first year publicly available. The structure of available variables is overall
constant for the entire period. In addition, to explore issues related to fertility I use information
on the number of births and infant deaths, both obtained from the National Institute of Statistics
and Geography (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía-INEGI). Similarly, I focus on
births from women in reproductive age from 2008 to 2017.
Because municipalities adopted SH at different stages, I compare SH treatment by virtue
of municipality and date of birth. Using information on birth date I define treatment based on SH
availability, with treatment depending on the timing of the outcome variable relative to the
month the program was launched in the corresponding municipality. My main specification
assigns SH a value of one if the program is available three months or one quarter prior to birth, a
proxy of the beginning of the third trimester. This choice is based on related literate that points
out that the third trimester of birth is the most important in determining weight (Almond et al.,

55

SEDESOL stands for Secretaria de Desarrollo Social and can be translated as Social Development Ministry.
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2011).56 Alternatively, I assign treatment if the program is available two, three, and four quarters
based on evidence that shows that birth weight is associated with antenatal maternal nutrition
(Verma et al., 2016). To control for the possibility that mothers travel to give birth in a different
location, treatment is assigned using the mother’s municipality of residence and not the place of
birth of the newborn.57 Alternatively I assign treatment using the mother’s municipality of birth.
Regarding the availability of treatment, as explained above, the rollout of SH occurred in
three stages. The first stage was launched on April of 2013 and the second on March of 2014
according to official and popular press announcements.58 Although the third stage was supposed
to be launched on 2015 in practice, it started in 2016. 59 Different from the first and second
stages, there is no official information on the actual start of this last stage. In my main
specifications I assume the third stage started in March of 2016 in line with the previous stage.60
Given that rollout information is available only at municipality by year level I assume a timing of
adoption in line with the launch dates for each state.
Since no municipality can start earlier than the launch date, early adoption should not be
a concern, however, delays could bias estimates. Such delays could occur due to federal funding
insufficiencies or implementation issues at the municipal level. Assigning treatment according to
the availability of the program as of one, two, three, and four months prior to birth can allow to
identify potential systematic delays at the national level. If the program was in practice delayed
for a quarter assigning treatment as of one quarter prior to birth will wrongly consider people that

56

This is so because it is during this period when most weight is gained by the baby.
My results could be biased downwards in absolute terms if unhealthier mothers seeking to obtain the subsidy
move and deliver in treated municipalities. Similarly, assuming the program is effective, this would happen too if
mothers living in treated municipalities during pregnancy deliver in untreated municipalities in search for better
hospital services.
58
Anecdotal evidence in newspapers suggests the time of adoption for the first and second stages coincides with the
official launch date. No anecdotal information confirms or suggests a solid launch date for the third stage.
59
Documentation associated with data obtained via request from SEDESOL mentions this explicitly.
60
I test alternative scenarios for the start of the third stage.
57
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are untreated as treated. In this case assigning treatment as two quarters prior to birth will be
more accurate in identifying treatment, two quarters will be a proxy for one quarter given the
delay. On the other hand, if the program is not delayed assigning treatment as of two quarters
prior to birth will wrongly consider people that are treated in the first months of operation of the
program as untreated. I use different assignments of treatment to identify better the actual timing
of the program. In addition, to control for potential biases related to differences in the actual start
of the program, I include the following pre-treatment variables interacted with a time trend:
fraction of urban area, fraction less than 5 years of age, fraction 65 years or over, fraction with
income less than the poverty line, the percent of land in the county that is farmland, and
municipal population.61

4.5 Methodology: Multiperiod DiD for causal inference
Recent literature has emphasized that regression models with time and unit fixed effects are
typically biased under the parallel trend assumption where units are treated at different points in
time (Imai & Kim, 2011; Borusyak and Jaravel, 2017; Abraham and Sun, 2018; Athey and
Imbens, 2018; Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille, 2018; Goodman-Bacon, 2018). Imai, Kim and
Wang (2019) propose a multiperiod difference-in-differences (DiD) methodology that eliminates
this bias and consistently estimates the average treatment effect for the treated (ATT). In the
midst of a fast growing literature on causal inference methods for panel data, the method
proposed by Imai, Kim and Wang (2019) is especially appealing as it applies to cases where
different units are treated at different points in time, where units can go back and forth between
treatment and control conditions, and without the need to assume monotonicity.62 This method

61

Research on Food Stamps in the US documents that counties with a greater fraction of urban, black, or lowincome population implemented the program in an earlier date and that counties with more land used in farming
implement later (Hoynes et al., 2007; Almond et al., 2011).
62
Monotonicity in this context refers to the case where treatment status increases stochastically within a group.
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connects two-way fixed effects models, i.e. unit and time fixed effects models, to matching
methods, relaxing linearity assumptions.
The identification strategy of this methodology, which is entirely nonparametric, assumes
that the average potential outcomes under the control condition have a parallel time trend for the
treatment and control groups without relying on a strict exogeneity assumption. This
methodology consists of a weighted average of the two-time period two-group difference in
difference estimators applied to each unit that switches from the control to the treatment
condition.63 The multi-period DID method employs a matching framework to assure the parallel
trend assumption holds, essentially generating counterfactual outcomes for each treated
observation in a given time period using observed outcomes from different time periods of the
same unit. 64 Importantly, while a traditional DiD estimator requires the absence of causal
relationship between past outcomes and current treatment, the multi-period DiD accounts for
such dynamic causal relationships. I present their formulation for the multiperiod difference-indifference estimator that accounts for both unit and time fixed effects.65 This refers to the case
with no time varying confounders, balanced panel dataset and matching based on the period prior
to treatment. 66 The methodology can include time varying confounders, unbalanced panel
datasets and matches based on further periods.
The methodology proposed by Imai, Kim and Wang (2019) evaluates the effect of a
policy in 𝑡 on both contemporaneous and future outcomes. For each unit 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑁 at time
𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇, a binary treatment indicator 𝑋𝑖𝑡 , taking the value of 1 if treated and 0 otherwise, as

63

Imai & Kim (2019) alternatively name this methodology as a Weighted Fixed Effects (WFE) due to the
equivalence between the multi-period DID and WFE.
64
This methodology extends to the case of balanced and unbalanced panel.
65
A previous paper by Imai & Kim (2019) presented a similar model that accounts for unit fixed effects only.
66
This formulation, its equivalence to the weighted two-way fixed effects estimator and the standard errors
calculation can be found in Imai & Kim (2019) and Imai, Kim and Wang (2019).
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well as a stream of outcome variables 𝑌𝑖,𝑡 , … , 𝑌𝑖,𝑡+𝐹 is observed.67 The number of leads, defined
by 𝐹, represent the outcome of interest 𝐹 time periods after the administration of treatment,
where 𝐹 = 0 represents the contemporaneous effect and 𝐹 = 1 the effect a year after. For each
treated observation (𝑖, 𝑡) with 𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 1 and 𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 = 0 , i.e. a treated observation should be
untreated in the preceding period, the methodology selects control observations with an identical
treatment history up to a certain number of periods, 𝐿. Since unit must be observed for 𝐹 time
periods after the treatment is administered and 𝐿 time periods before the treatment is
administered, different values of 𝐹 will potentially imply different sets of treated and control
units.
Once this matching set is determined for each treated observation, this set is refined to
give more weight to those units that are most similar to each treated unit using matching and
weighting techniques based on covariates and previous outcomes. The matching methods used,
the Mahalanobis distance and propensity scores, basically select a subset including up to a
specific number of most similar control units to the corresponding treatment unit. The weighting
method used, the inverse propensity score, essentially generalizes matching methods by
assigning weights giving more weight to those control units that are most similar to the treatment
unit instead of giving an equal weight. Based on averages over this refined set, synthetic
counterfactual outcomes are calculated. The effect of a policy is then calculated using a two by
two difference-in-difference estimator to each treated unit and its synthetic control unit to adjust
for unobserved time trends. Finally, it averages of all such differences. The calculated Average
Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT) only considers treated units that have a non-empty
matching set, i.e. units that change from the control to treatment condition and have at least one

67

Where the outcome is assumed to be realized after the administration of the treatment.
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counterfactual unit that is untreated while this transition happens. This is important to consider
when interpreting results as not all observations are part of the calculation. Appendix A3
explains how the matching sets are constructed and how the ATT is calculated. The reader is
referred to Imai & Kim (2019) and Imai, Kim and Wang (2019) for a complete description of the
methodology.

4.6 Empirical Analysis
As explained in the data section, treatment at the individual level depends on availability at the
month of birth. Since treatment is at the municipal level, I collapse data to municipality-year
cells with the means from 2008 to 2017. As detailed above the treatment variable must be a
binary variable taking the value of 1 or 0, therefore when collapsing individual level variables, I
round up the treatment variable which would otherwise be a fraction, to be either 0 or 1. 68
Overall, the distribution of treatment shows that municipalities treated remain treated. The only
exceptions occur for three municipalities that are untreated throughout the entire period and two
municipalities that are treated until the second to last year and then become untreated in the last
year.
Visualizing treatment variation across municipalities and years for SH is useful to
understand better how the comparisons between treated and control observations is made. In line
with Imai and Kim (2019), Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of treatment across years and
municipalities, where blue and gray rectangles represent treated and control observations
respectively. As it can be observed less than a fifth of all municipalities gets treated starting
2013, around a quarter gets treated starting 2014, and the remaining starts to be treated in 2016.

68

This fraction rounds up to 0 or 1 in a municipality-year cell depending on the fraction of births treated. This
depends on distribution of births across months and the month the program is launched.
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Constructing the matched set for each treated observation based on treatment history
requires to define the number of lags to adjust for, 𝐿. I condition this period to be five years, i.e.
L=5. Five years is the longest period preceding treatment for first stage municipalities. Given the
particular staggered design of SH, where virtually every unit remains treated, shorter periods of
time should yield essentially the same result. Figure 2.3 illustrates the distribution of matched
sizes of control units that share the same five years treatment history as a treated observation.69
Figure 2.3 indicates that 400 municipalities from the first stage can potentially be
matched to any of the remaining 2,057 municipalities (rightmost bar), 612 municipalities from
the second stage can be matched to any of the remaining 1,445 municipalities not part of the first
and second stage (middle bar), and that the remaining 1,442 municipalities assisted during the
third stage can be matched to the 3 municipalities never treated. This three units, being untreated,
have themselves empty matched sets.
As explained in the previous section to estimate the ATT requires to define other
matching criteria. Besides the length of the treatment history, 𝐿, which is set to a five years
period as explained above, one needs to define the number of leads to be estimated, 𝐹. My main
sample and results refer to the treatment effect on the contemporaneous period, 𝐹 = 0. In
addition, I consider up to two time periods after treatment implementation, 𝐹 = 2.70
To satisfy the parallel trend assumption requires to adjust for confounders such as past
outcomes and covariates. The main outcomes of interest to be analyzed are birth weight and low
birthweight. Time-varying covariates include age, years of education, marriage status, insurance

69

This distribution is virtually the same for shorter periods due to the staggered adoption of SH, however, periods of
six and seven years would exclude municipalities from the first stage and second stage respectively.
70
This is the maximum number of leads possible considering the first time the program is implemented is in 2013
and municipalities are observed from 2008 to 2017. As mentioned above, estimates are sensitive to the number of
leads.
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availability, per capita public investments, and per capita social assistance transfers. 71 Other
covariates include 2010 municipality variables which are log of population, percentage of land in
farming, percentage of population five years or younger, percentage of population 65 years or
older, unemployment rate, percentage of income eligible population, and average income per
capita. To assess whether there are extensive effects associated with the program, which would
arise if SH also increased the number of births or decreased the number of fetal deaths. If SH
increased the rate of pregnancies that lead to delivery, even if the program had beneficial impacts
on birth outcomes, inframarginal births that would not otherwise occur could bias estimates in
the opposite direction. I also present results on other birth related outcomes including very low
birthweight, gestational age, height and gender.
An advantage of the methodology proposed by Imai, Kim and Wang (2019) is its
transparency in how comparisons are made between treated and control observations. My results
consider treated units as those municipalities from the first and second stage. Matching sets for
the first stage originate in second and third stage municipalities and matching sets for the second
stage originate in third stage municipalities. Due to the staggered implementation of the program,
third stage municipalities essentially do not have any control units and so are not considered as
treated units.72
Under the main specification, without controlling for any covariates, using the
methodology proposed is equivalent to estimate the following two-way fixed effect model but
assigning particular weights during the estimation process:

71

Social assistance transfers are included to control for other expansions in social programs that occurred during this
time period.
72
My main sample excludes three municipalities that remain untreated throughout all the period of analysis.
Including these three municipalities complicates interpreting results as matching methods do not result in balanced
covariates. This occurs because including these three municipalities provides the exact same matching set of three
municipalities for all third stage municipalities and these account for more than half of all municipalities.
Researchers using this methodology should be aware of these considerations when interpreting their own results.
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𝑌𝑚𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 𝑆𝐻𝑚𝑡 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜆𝑚 + 𝜀𝑚𝑡 ,

(1)

where 𝑌𝑚𝑡 is the outcome variable of interest in municipality 𝑚 at time 𝑡, 𝑆𝐻𝑚𝑡 is an indicator
variable taking the value of 1 if a municipality is exposed to the program and 0 otherwise, 𝜆𝑡
refers to year fixed effects, 𝜆𝑚 refers to municipality fixed effects, and 𝜀𝑚𝑡 refers to the error
term. Without making using of the methodology proposed, estimating 𝛾1would require finding
the value of 𝛾̂1 𝐹𝐸 that solves the following equation:
𝑇
̅̅̅̅ ̅̅̅̅ ̅̅̅̅̅
𝛾̂1 𝐹𝐸 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∑𝑁
𝑚=1 ∑𝑡=1 {(𝑌𝑚𝑡 − 𝑌𝑚 − 𝑌𝑡 + 𝑌 )

(2)

−𝛾̂1 𝐹𝐸 (𝑆𝐻𝑚𝑡 − ̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝑆𝐻𝑚 − ̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝑆𝐻𝑡 + ̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝑆𝐻 )}2 ,
where the bar on top of the variables refer to means within municipalities, within years, and
across all observations. For the outcome variable, 𝑌𝑚𝑡 , ̅̅̅̅
𝑌𝑚 is the within municipalities means,
̅̅̅̅
𝑌𝑡 the within years mean, and ̅̅̅̅
𝑌 the overall mean. The methodology proposed by Imai, Kim,
and Wang (2019) gives instead a different weight to each observation:
𝑇
∗
∗
̅̅̅∗ ̅̅̅̅̅
̅̅̅̅
𝛾̂1 𝑊𝐹𝐸 = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑖𝑛 ∑𝑁
𝑚=1 ∑𝑡=1 𝑊𝑚𝑡 {(𝑌𝑚𝑡 − 𝑌𝑚 − 𝑌𝑡 + 𝑌 )

(3)

∗ − ̅̅̅̅̅
∗ )}2 ,
̅̅̅̅̅̅̅̅
−𝛾̂1 𝑊𝐹𝐸 (𝑆𝐻𝑚𝑡 − ̅̅̅̅̅̅
𝑆𝐻𝑚
𝑆𝐻𝑡∗ + 𝑆𝐻

where 𝑊𝑚𝑡 refers to weights and asterisks indicate weighted averages using 𝑊𝑚𝑡 . Intuitively, what
these weights do is giving more weight to observations having a comparison set to build a
synthetic control unit and less weight to those that do not. The reader is referred to Imai, Kim
and Wang (2019) for a detail explanation on how these weights are calculated.
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4.7 Empirical results
Figure 4.4 shows the covariate balance of different matching methods over the pre-treatment
time period. The vertical axis shows the standardized mean covariate balance for SH treatment.
The first column shows the results from the methodology before matching based on the treatment
history. Using the nomenclature of Imai, Kim and Wang (2019), “Before Refinement” refers to
the case where match is done based on treatment history only, without including covariates and
outcome histories.73 This column shows the results from matching based on the treatment history
during the five-year period prior to administration.74 The second, third, and fourth columns show
the results from refining the matching sets based on the lagged outcomes and covariates using
the different matching procedures mentioned in the methodology section. As noticed before,
while the original sample includes three municipalities that are untreated throughout, I exclude
these from the main results.75
Table 4.1 shows the average contemporaneous effect of SH on the fraction of births with
Low Birth Weight (weight<2,500 grams) and the average Birth Weight (grams) using the
Propensity Score Weighting methodology. 76 The Propensity Score Weighting methodology is
my preferred specification as it provides the best balance in terms of covariate and outcome
histories. All results are estimated considering a pretreatment history period of five years. 77

The “Before Matching” case does not refer to an unweighted two-way fixed effects specification. Results from
linear regressions specifications that correspond to the unweighted two-way fixed effects case are provided below.
74
Given the staggered implementation of SH, where municipalities remain treated after the first implementation,
matching based on one and up to five periods of treatment history yield the same results.
75
Including these municipalities slightly affect results without changing conclusions. Including these municipalities,
however, make interpreting results less straight forward because these three municipalities provide the exact same
matching set of exactly three municipalities for all third stage municipalities. Including these municipalities lead to
covariate balances displaying large differences between the treatment and control groups. I similarly exclude two
municipalities that go back to the control condition in 2017 after being treated in 2016.
76
The main results use the mother’s place of residence to assign treatment. Using the mother’s place of birth yields
similar results.
77
Due to the staggered implementation of CNCH, alternatively including less than five lags yields essentially the
same results.
73
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Standard errors are based on 1,000 block bootstrap replicates. I assign treatment as of one, two,
three, or four quarters prior to birth. 78 Each column shows the results associated with each
treatment assignment. Table 4.1 indicates that SH results in a reduction of at most 0.1 percentage
point, 2.3% with respect of the mean value, in the fraction of births with LBW, and an increase
in terms of birthweight in grams of at most 1 gram, 0.03% with respect to the mean value.
Overall, most benefits are observed from exposure as of the start of the second trimester,
something that could be explained by an effective delay in the rollout of the program of about
three months. Results from other refining methods associated with the Multiperiod Differencein-Difference Methodology are more optimistic about the program both in terms of LBW and
weight in grams. In terms of LBW, other refinement methods show a reduction of at most 0.4
percentage points, 6.7% with respect to the mean value. Regarding birthweight, other less
rigorous refinement methods indicate an increase in birthweight of at most 6 grams, 0.19% with
respect to the mean value. While most specifications point that the program was beneficial, there
are some specifications that indicate otherwise. Table A4.4.1 in Appendix A4.4 shows the results
from all refining methods used. While several estimates are statistically insignificant, these are
relevant when compared to the mean value and most of them point into moderate benefits from
the program.
To investigate if my results could be driven by compositional effects, I estimate the
impact on SH on fertility rates (per 10,000) and fetal death rates (per 10,000). Overall, as shown
in Table 4.2, while results are mixed, I find that overall both fertility rates and fetal death rates
seem to decrease slightly. These effects on fertility could be the result of individuals choosing to

78

Treatment is assigned as of at least one quarter prior to birth as this is a proxy for beginning of the 3rd trimester,
which is when the newborn gains most of its weight. Treatment as of one quarter prior to birth will regard some
untreated units as treated if the program was effectively implemented later than the official date. Similarly, treatment
as of two quarters prior to birth will regard some treated units as untreated.
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lower the quantity of children to promote quality in response to the program. The fact that fetal
death rates decreased supports the claim that SH had a positive impact. Figure 4.5 shows the
covariate balance for both fertility rates and fetal death rates.
Studying the effect of the program in the longer term shows similar results. Figure 4.6
and Figure 4.7 show the average effects for the three-year period after SH is implemented using
also a pretreatment history period of five years for different matching methodologies.79 Using
one of the Imai, Kim and Wang (2019) methodology attributes, matching control units based on
the future treatment sequence, I limit the comparison to that of treated units versus not treated
units over this three year period. Under this setup, treated municipalities correspond to first stage
municipalities, i.e. those treated from 2013 on, while control units are drawn from third state
municipalities, i.e. those that are treated from 2016 on. Figure 4.6 indicates an overall consistent
reduction in the fraction of births with LBW and a slight increase in average birth weight in
grams.80 Figure 4.7 indicates an overall slight reduction in both fertility and fetal mortality rates.
The multiperiod matching methodology assigns control units based on the composition of
each municipality in terms of different demographic indicators including municipality variables
as well as demographic characteristics. In turn, although not every woman is eligible, we could
expect matched municipalities to have similar compositions in terms of income eligible women
since the percentage of income eligible population at the municipal level is included in the list of
covariates over which the matching procedure is done. Yet, in order to ensure that comparisons
are made between similarly eligible individuals I restrict the sample to income eligible women.
In order to do this, I replicate the methodology used by the Mexican government to determine

𝐿 = 5 and 𝐹 = 2.
Notice that third stage municipalities are not considered as treated units because they do not have control units
available to construct matching sets. Second stage municipalities are not part of the control group because these are
treated from 2014 on.
79
80
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eligibility at the household level. Using this methodology, income eligible women represent 5%
of the total population. This is consistent with proportion of people originally targeted by SH,
5%, and the proportion of people treated, at least 2.5% considering PAL-SH alone during the
first two years. The methodology is detailed in Appendix A4.6. Table 4.3 shows the results from
a sample that only includes women that are estimated to be income eligible using the propensity
score weighting. Table 4.3 indicates that SH was especially beneficial for income eligible
women. Results, however, do not seem to be consistent across all matching methodologies as it
can be observed in Table A4.6.2 in Appendix A4.6.
Table 4.4 and 4.5 show the results from using linear regression models. These results
correspond to the unweighted two-way fixed effects version of Imai, Kim, and Wang (2019).81
Without controlling for covariates there seems to be a reduction ranging from 0.02 to 0.3
percentage points in the fraction of births born with LBW, and an increase in average birth
weight ranging from 3.28 to 5.17 grams. Controlling for covariates, however, reduces the size
and significance of estimates. Figure A4.5.1 in Appendix A4.5 shows the estimates from event
studies on the municipality-year means sample. These estimates point out to the existence of
pretends that further justify the need of testing alternative approaches that can help sufficing the
parallel-trend assumption. In the end, however, estimates from unweighted linear regressions are
not entirely different from those coming from the matching procedure.
Comparisons using municipality-year means may fail to capture the impact of the
program at the individual level. Figure A4.5.2, shows the event study results using the sample
with individual observations. Although it is more difficult to rule out the existence of pretends,
SH shows a detrimental impact in terms of both birthweight and LBW incidence. One particular
As mentioned above, the “Before Matching” case, using the nomenclature of Imai, Kim and Wang (2019),
corresponds refers to the case where match is not done on the treatment history. The “Before Matching” case does
not refer to an unweighted two-way fixed effects specification.
81
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concern to evaluate SH at the individual level is that, not every individual in the municipality
receives the program. To take this into account, I use the measure of income eligibility
previously described to implement a triple difference in difference where I compare the change
from income eligible individuals to that of income ineligible individuals in response to treatment.
The details on how this income eligibility index is calculated are shown in Appendix A4.6. If the
program was effective, I would expect income eligible individuals to do better in treated
locations after the program is launched. Table A4.6.3 shows the results from linear regressions
interacting the treatment variable with a household level measure of income eligibility
controlling for year fixed effects, municipality fixed effects, and covariates. Results from Table
A4.6.3 indicate that income eligible individuals do not necessarily do better as a result of the
program. Table A4.6.4 controls instead for year fixed effects, state fixed effects, and region by
year fixed effects, allowing for more variation to be captured by the estimates. Results from this
specification indicate that the program was beneficial for income eligible individuals. Similar
results to those in Table A4.6.4 hold when discarding location fixed effects and only including
year fixed effects.
As observed from the estimates above, there could be potential biases associated with
fertility due to better nutrition prior to pregnancy. Better nutrition conditions could either
promote inframarginal births or could deter pregnancies as parents decide to invest more in fewer
babies. To tackle this problem, I difference off treatment by time of exposure for women that
were already pregnant at the time of introduction. The main sample to be analyzed consists of
births occurring since the first month the program was launched in the first stage in April of 2013
until 40 weeks ahead, the typical duration of pregnancy. A full description on this specification is
provided in Appendix A4.7. Results from Table A4.7.1 indicate that being exposed for a longer
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period, since the first and second trimester of birth as opposed to the third trimester yield benefits
in terms of birthweight and LBW. It seems, however, that income eligible individuals are not
doing better with more exposure as it can be observed from differencing off income eligibility.
Conclusions hold even while including state fixed effects as opposed to municipality fixed
effects.

4.8 Discussion
Pregnant women are among the most vulnerable groups to malnutrition. Worldwide, each year
20 million babies are born underweight, the main cause being uterine malnutrition (Fanzo et al.,
2018).82 An established literature identifies that having a low birthweight at birth affects health
during childhood and adulthood as well as human capital accumulation (Behrman et al., 2004).
This evidence suggests that investing in improving nutrition of pregnant women can have large
social benefits. In 2013, the Mexican government set in motion Sin Hambre (SH), one of the
most important large-scale food assistance policies implemented in recent years in Mexico and
Latin America representing an average annual expenditure of around 1% of Mexico’s GDP from
2013 to 2017. This paper estimates the overall impact of SH on birth weight using a multiperiod
difference-in-difference matching method as proposed by Imai, Kim and Wang (2019). The
results from this paper have a causal interpretation as these satisfy the parallel trend assumption
according to balance checking diagnostics.
My results indicate that exposure to the program has at best a moderate impact on
birthweight and LBW. Overall, I observe mixed evidence across specifications, with estimates
leaning towards optimistic yet small effects. Nevertheless, while some estimates are pessimistic,
none of these are significant, nor economically or statistically. I argue this inconsistency may be
82

Uterine malnutrition is a condition that has been associated with socio-economic factors, maternal lifestyles and
medical risks (De Bernabé et al., 2004; Kramer, 1987; Cnattingius, 2004).
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related to the program design which makes evaluating it challenging. Since the program
prioritizes on poor municipalities and poor individuals, control units could be mechanically
outperforming treated units if the impact was not large enough. Moderate benefits found, some
of which are statistically and economically significant, are meaningful considering that even
minor increases in birth weight positively affect adult health status, educational attainment, and
earnings (Behrman et al., 2004).
My preferred specification, using the propensity score weighting matching methodology,
shows that SH reduces the fraction of LBW births by 0.1 percentage points (2.3% with respect to
the mean value). In terms of birthweight in grams, under this same specification the impact of
SH represents a decrease of 0.4 grams (0.01% with respect to the mean value). Studying the
effect of the program on individuals considered as income eligible to social programs indicate
larger impacts, although not across all specifications. In particular, the effects corresponding to
the propensity score weighting methodology do show a reduction of 0.6 percentage points in the
fraction of LBW (10.5% with respect to the mean value) and an increase of 9.2 grams in
birthweight (0.29% with respect to the mean value). Some of the estimates are in line with
similar assistance programs. For instance, “Chile Crece Contigo”, an early-life health and social
welfare program implemented in Chile in 2007, has significant effects on birth weight of
approximately 10 grams, Clarke et al. (2018). Similarly, these results appear to be comparable to
the results from the food stamps program in the US which range from 2 to 5 grams for the
African American subsample, Almond et al. (2011).
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Figures
Figure74.1. Distribution of Treatment Across Municipalities and Years

Note: Author’s tabulations of SH implementation by municipality from 2012 to 2017 using information obtained via
direct request from SEDESOL. The light areas represent untreated municipalities while dark areas represent treated
municipalities.
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Figure84.2. Distribution of Treatment across municipalities and years for SH

Note: Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of treatment for SH based on a random sample of 100 municipalities. Blue
and gray rectangles represent treatment and control municipality-year observations respectively.
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Figure94.3. Frequency Distribution of the Number of Matched Control Units

Note: Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of match sizes of control units that share the same treatment history as a
treated observation for five years prior to the treatment year. The horizontal axis refers to different potential sizes for
matching sets while the vertical axis refers to the frequency of sizes.
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Figure104.4. Covariate Balance Under Different Matching Methods, Birthweight and Low Birth
Weight

Notes: Each plot shows the standardized mean difference (vertical axis) over the pre-treatment time period of five
years (horizontal axis). The estimation sample includes means by municipality for years including 2008-2017 where
municipalities with cells including less than 25 observations are dropped. The treatment is assigned as of 3 months
prior to birth (proxy for beginning of the 3rd trimester). The first column, Before Matching, refers to the balance
before matching on the five-year treatment history. The second column, Before Refinement, refers to the balance
after matching on the five-year treatment history but before any refinement method. The remaining columns show
the covariate balance after applying different refinement methods. Lines represent the balance of the lagged outcome
variables and covariates over the pre-treatment period.
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Figure114.5. Covariate Balance Under Different Matching Methods, Fertility and Fetal Deaths

Notes: Each plot shows the standardized mean difference (vertical axis) over the pre-treatment time period of five
years (horizontal axis). The estimation sample includes means by municipality for years including 2008-2017 where
municipalities with cells including less than 25 observations are dropped. The treatment is assigned as of 3 months
prior to birth (proxy for beginning of the 3rd trimester). The first column, Before Matching, refers to the balance
before matching on the five-year treatment history. The second column, Before Refinement, refers to the balance
after matching on the five-year treatment history but before any refinement method. The remaining columns show
the covariate balance after applying different refinement methods. Lines represent the balance of the lagged outcome
variables and covariates over the pre-treatment period.
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Figure124.6. Estimated Average Longer-Term Effects of SH on Birthweight and Low Birth
Weight

Notes: Each plot estimates the average effects of SH on the outcome variable of interest. The treatment is assigned
as of 3 months prior to birth (proxy for beginning of the 3rd trimester). The estimation sample includes means by
municipality for years including 2008-2017 where municipalities with cells including less than 25 observations are
dropped. Estimates adjust for treatment, outcome and covariate histories during the five-year period prior to
treatment, i.e. L=5. The estimates for the average effects of SH are shown for the three-year period after the
transition, i.e., F=4. Five different refinement methods are considered. Controls include 2010 municipality variables
(log of population, percentage of land in farming, percentage of population five years or younger, percentage of
population 65 years or older, unemployment rate and average income per capita), age, years of education, marriage
status, insurance availability, per capita public investments, and per capita social assistance transfers. The vertical
bars represent 95% confidence intervals based on 1,000 block bootstrap replicates.
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Figure134.7. Estimated Average Longer-Term Effects of SH on Fertility and Fetal Death Rates

Notes: Each plot estimates the average effects of SH on the outcome variable of interest. The treatment is assigned
as of 3 months prior to birth (proxy for beginning of the 3rd trimester). The estimation sample includes means by
municipality for years including 2008-2017 where municipalities with cells including less than 25 observations are
dropped. Estimates adjust for treatment, outcome and covariate histories during the five-year period prior to
treatment, i.e. L=5. The estimates for the average effects of SH are shown for the three-year period after the
transition, i.e., F=4. Five different refinement methods are considered. Controls include 2010 municipality variables
(log of population, percentage of land in farming, percentage of population five years or younger, percentage of
population 65 years or older, unemployment rate and average income per capita), age, years of education, marriage
status, insurance availability, per capita public investments, and per capita social assistance transfers. The vertical
bars represent 95% confidence intervals based on 1,000 block bootstrap replicates.

36

Tables
Table154.1. Estimated Average Contemporaneous Effects of SH on Birthweight Outcomes
Multiperiod Difference-in-Difference Methodology using Propensity Score Weighting
SH implemented as of X quarters prior to birth
A. Fraction < 2,500 grams
SH
Std. Dev.
% Impact (coef/mean)
N. of obs.

1 qrt

2 qrts

3 qrts

4 qrts

0.0001
(0.0008)
0.22%
19,870

-0.0014
(0.0011)
-2.32%
19,870

-0.0005
(0.0007)
-0.75%
19,870

-0.0011
(0.0009)
-1.75%
19,870

B. Birthweight in grams
SH
1.0517
-0.4031
-0.2495
0.0372
Std. Dev.
(1.5787)
(1.6843)
(1.47)
(1.5044)
% Impact (coef/mean)
0.033%
-0.01%
-0.0%
0.00%
N. of obs.
19,870
19,870
19,870
19,870
Notes: Each parameter is from a separate regression of the outcome variable on SH implementation dummy. The
treatment is assigned as of 2, 3, and 4 quarters prior to birth. The estimation sample includes means by municipality
for years including 2008-2017 where municipalities including cells with less than 25 observations are dropped.
Estimates corresponding adjust for treatment, outcome and covariate histories during the five-year period prior to
treatment, i.e., L=5. Five different methods are considered. Controls include 2010 municipality variables (log of
population, percentage of land in farming, percentage of population five years or younger, percentage of population
65 years or older, unemployment rate, average income per capita, and percentage of income eligible population),
age, years of education, marriage status, insurance availability, per capita public investments, and per capita social
assistance transfers. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors correspond to block bootstrap replicates.
*Coefficient is significant at 10% level. **Coefficient is significant at 5% level. ***Coefficient is significant at 1%
level.
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Table164.2. Estimated Average Contemporaneous Effects of SH on Fertility and Fetal Deaths
Multiperiod Difference-in-Difference Methodology using Propensity Score Weighting
SH implemented as of X quarters prior to birth
1 qrt

2 qrts

3 qrts

4 qrts

B. Fertility rate per 10,000
SH
-9.10
-0.65
-3.58
-3.58
Std. Dev.
(4.8648)
(7.9361)
(5.8401)
(5.6046)
% Impact (coef/mean)
-6.74%
-0.48%
-2.65%
-2.65%
N. of obs.
19,500
19,500
19,500
19,500
C. Fetal death rate per 10,000
SH (1 qrt)
-0.07
-0.20
-0.20
-0.20
Std. Dev.
(0.206)
(0.3725)
(0.3635)
(0.3662)
% Impact (coef/mean)
-0.65%
-1.80%
-1.77%
-1.77%
N. of obs.
19,500
19,500
19,500
19,500
Notes: Each parameter is from a separate regression of the outcome variable on SH implementation dummy. The
treatment is assigned as of 2, 3, and 4 quarters prior to birth. The estimation sample includes means by municipality
for years including 2008-2017 where municipalities with cells including less than 25 observations are dropped.
Estimates adjust for treatment, outcome and covariate histories during the five-year period prior to treatment, i.e.,
L=5. Five different methods are considered. Controls include 2010 municipality variables (log of population,
percentage of land in farming, percentage of population five years or younger, percentage of population 65 years or
older, unemployment rate, average income per capita, and percentage of income eligible population), age, years of
education, marriage status, insurance availability, per capita public investments, and per capita social assistance
transfers. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors from the matching methods correspond to block
bootstrap replicates. *Coefficient is significant at 10% level. **Coefficient is significant at 5% level. ***Coefficient
is significant at 1% level.
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Table174.3. Estimated Average Contemporaneous Effects of SH on Birthweight Outcomes for
Income Eligible Individuals, Multiperiod Difference-in-Difference Methodology using
Propensity Score Weighting
SH implemented as of X quarters prior to birth
1 qrt

2 qrts

3 qrts

4 qrts

A. Fraction < 2,500 grams
SH
0.0042
-0.0063
0.0034
0.0034
Std. Dev.
(0.0033)
(0.0069)
(0.0032)
(0.003)
% Impact (coef/mean)
6.92%
-10.5%
5.63%
5.63%
1,040
1,040
1,040
1,040
N. of obs.
B. Birthweight in grams
SH (1 qrt)
-18.2769
9.2506
2.639
2.639
Std. Dev.
(9.2983)
(10.7741)
(7.7195)
(7.9856)
% Impact (coef/mean)
-0.58%
0.29%
0.08%
0.08%
1,040
1,040
1,040
1,040
N. of obs.
Notes: Each parameter is from a separate regression of the outcome variable on SH implementation dummy. The
treatment is assigned as of 2, 3, and 4 quarters prior to birth. The estimation sample includes means by municipality
for years including 2008-2017 where municipalities including cells with less than 25 observations are dropped.
Estimates corresponding adjust for treatment, outcome and covariate histories during the five-year period prior to
treatment, i.e., L=5. Five different methods are considered. Controls include 2010 municipality variables (log of
population, percentage of land in farming, percentage of population five years or younger, percentage of population
65 years or older, unemployment rate, average income per capita, and percentage of income eligible population),
age, years of education, marriage status, insurance availability, per capita public investments, and per capita social
assistance transfers. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors correspond to block bootstrap replicates.
*Coefficient is significant at 10% level. **Coefficient is significant at 5% level. ***Coefficient is significant at 1%
level.
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Table184.4. Linear Regression Estimates on the Effect of SH on Birthweight Outcomes,
unweighted two-way fixed effects not including covariates
`

A. Birthweight < 2,500 grams
SH
% Impact (coef/mean)
N. of obs.
B. Birthweight in grams
SH
% Impact (coef/mean)
N. of obs.
Year fixed effects
Mun. fixed effects

SH implemented as of X quarters prior to birth
1 qrt
2 qrts
3 qrts
4 qrts

-0.00194***
(0.00066)
-3.16%
19870

-0.00252***
(0.00077)
-4.11%
19870

-0.00315***
(0.00072)
-5.14%
19870

-0.00324***
(0.00071)
-5.29%
19870

3.28**
(1.43)
0.10%
19870

3.99***
(1.55)
0.10%
19870

5.09***
(1.49)
0.16%
19870

5.17***
(1.50)
0.16%
19870

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

Notes: Each parameter is from a separate regression of the outcome variable on SH implementation dummy. The
treatment is assigned as of 2, 3, and 4 quarters prior to birth. Each column shows the estimate corresponding to each
of these timings. Controls include 2010 municipality variables (log of population, percentage of land in farming,
percentage of population five years or younger, percentage of population 65 years or older, unemployment rate,
average income per capita, and percentage of income eligible population) each interacted with a linear time trend,
age, years of education, marriage status, insurance availability, per capita public investments, and per capita social
assistance transfers. The estimation sample includes municipality by year means from 2008 to 2017. Standard errors
are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *Coefficient is significant at 10% level.
**Coefficient is significant at 5% level. ***Coefficient is significant at 1% level.

40

Table194.5. Linear Regression Estimates on the Effect of SH on Birthweight Outcomes,
unweighted two-way fixed effects including covariates
`

A. Birthweight < 2,500 grams
SH
% Impact (coef/mean)
Dep. var. mean
N. of obs.
B. Birthweight in grams
SH
% Impact (coef/mean)
Dep. Variable mean
N. of obs.
Year fixed effects
Mun. fixed effects
Covariates

SH implemented as of X quarters prior to birth
1 qrt
2 qrts
3 qrts
4 qrts

-0.00018
(0.00065)
-0.29%
0.06131
19850

-0.00063
(0.00076)
-1.03%
0.06131
19850

-0.00028
(0.00070)
-0.46%
0.06131
19850

-0.00039
(0.00069)
-0.64%
0.06131
19850

0.65
(1.38)
0.00%
3153.53
19850

1.08
(1.51)
0.03%
3153.53
19850

0.41
(1.44)
0.00%
3153.53
19850

0.52
(1.44)
0.00%
3153.53
19850

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

Notes: Each parameter is from a separate regression of the outcome variable on SH implementation dummy. The
treatment is assigned as of 2, 3, and 4 quarters prior to birth. Each column shows the estimate corresponding to each
of these timings. Controls include 2010 municipality variables (log of population, percentage of land in farming,
percentage of population five years or younger, percentage of population 65 years or older, unemployment rate,
average income per capita, and percentage of income eligible population) each interacted with a linear time trend,
age, years of education, marriage status, insurance availability, per capita public investments, and per capita social
assistance transfers. The estimation sample includes municipality by year means from 2008 to 2017. Standard errors
are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *Coefficient is significant at 10% level.
**Coefficient is significant at 5% level. ***Coefficient is significant at 1% level.
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Appendices
A Appendix to 4 – Supplemental Tables and Figures
A4.1. SH’s main assistance programs description
Acronym1
CC
PAL

PAL-SH
LICONSA
PAR
PCS
PET
PDHO2

PESA
PETC
PROCAMPO
SP

Objective
Consists of the inception of several many food kitchens providing meals for
free or at subsidized prices.
Originally devised to provide unconditional cash transfers were PDHO could
not due to the unavailability of schools and clinics. With the introduction of
PAL-SH, PAL remained to provide unconditional cash transfers where the
unavailability of designated stores would prevent the debit card use.
Switch from PAL cash transfer to a transfer delivered by means of a prepaid
card that is only usable in designated grocery stores and on selected goods.
Although not a program itself, is a parastatal firm that supplies milk at
subsidized prices.
Offers food items and other staples at discounted prices by means of
designated stores and is operated by DICONSA, a federal agency.
Promoted training and implemented actions towards reducing post-harvest
losses due to storage, transportation and commercialization.
Provides temporary income assistance to individuals 16 years or older that
observe a decrease in income due to economic, social, emergencies or
disasters. Income is provided in exchange of work for local social projects.
Cash transfers conditional on school attendance of children, cash transfers
conditional on clinic visits of both children and old household members, and
food supplements for women during pregnancy or lactancy and children five
years old or less.
Installs family gardens and provides monetary transfers to people performing
agricultural, aquaculture and fishing activities.
School free school lunch meals to students in public schools.
Monetary transfers to local farmers.
Social protection in health that offers public insurance to all citizens, specially
aiming to promote health coverage for those not formally employed.

1. Each administration rebrands and modifies the name of social assistance programs. I use the acronyms and
names corresponding to the period from 2000 to 2012 prior to the introduction of SH: Comedores Comunitarios
(CC), Sistema de Distribuidoras Conasupo (DICONSA), Leche Industrializada Conasupo (LICONSA), Programa
de Apoyo Alimentario (PAL), Programa de Apoyo Alimentario Sin Hambre (PAL-SH ), Programa de Abasto
Rural (PAR), Programa de Coinversion Social (PCS), PET (Programa de Empleo Temporal), Programa de
Desarrollo Humano Oportunidades (PDHO), Proyecto Estratégico para la Seguridad Alimentaria (PESA),
Programa Escuelas de Tiempo Completo (PETC), Programa de Apoyos para el Campo (PROCAMPO), and
Seguro Popular (SP).
2. It is commonly known as Oportunidades because that was the name it held when the conditional components
were introduced in 2002. From 2012 to 2018 it changed its name to “Prospera.” A somewhat different version of
“Oportunidades” was named “Progresa” from 1994-2000 and “Solidaridad” before that.
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A4.2. SH, Selection Process of Municipalities
To select municipalities into each stage, SEDESOL first ranked all municipalities in descending
order, placing the most underserved on top, based on four indexes: P%, the proportion of people
under extreme poverty, P#, the absolute number of people under extreme poverty, PI%, the
proportion of people under both extreme poverty and food insecurity, and PI#, the absolute
number of people under both extreme poverty and food insecurity.83 According to SEDESOL,
these indexes were calculated using information from the Census and the ENIGH from 2010 as
this was the latest year available in 2012, a year before the program was launched. In order to
determine the first stage municipalities, a threshold for each index was determined to select the
first municipalities that jointly accounted for at least 50% of the estimated objective population
in 2012, i.e. the set of people under extreme poverty and food insecurity.84
The selection process followed by SEDESOL had the objective of covering all states in
the country and in doing so, at least half of the objective population. For the first stage,
SEDESOL started by selecting the highest ranked municipalities out from each index
abovementioned: up to 167 based on P%, 184 based on P#, 140 based on PI%, and 150 based on
PI#.85 A municipality is eligible if it ranks above the corresponding threshold for either of the
four indexes. After eliminating duplicates, these sets of municipalities together comprise a list of
381 municipalities from 28 different states. To increase national representativity SEDESOL
included 19 municipalities based on other related criteria.86 First, it included six municipalities
from four states not encompassed in the former selection to include all 32 states. Second, it

83

See SEDESOL (2013b) and SEDESOL (2014) for more details.
The first stage covered 51.7% of the objective population (SEDESOL, 2013b).
85
Other than assisting 50% of the objective population the exact reasoning behind each of these thresholds is not
explicit in publicly available documents.
86
The exact motivation behind these thresholds is not expressed in public documentation.
84
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included 9 municipalities that held a significant proportion of the objective population.87 Third, it
included 4 municipalities where the abovementioned indexes had relevant increments from 2008
to 2010. This latter process led to a total of 400 municipalities for the first stage.
For the second stage, SH determined thresholds to reach, together with the first stage, at
least 75% of the objective population.88 For the second stage, SEDESOL selected the first 455
municipalities out of each index producing a set of 900 municipalities, including 397 from the
first stage. In the same vein as in the first stage, additional municipalities were added to
accommodate the following considerations. First, it added 4 municipalities to increase national
representativity including one municipality from Colima, a state not previously selected. Second,
it included 4 municipalities affected by natural disasters in 2013 in the state of Guerrero. Third, it
included 45 border municipalities not considered in the first stage. Fourth, it included 28
municipalities from the states of Michoacán, Mexico, and Guerrero from “Tierra Caliente,” a
region characterized by a hot climate mainly inhabited by indigenous communities that were not
contained within the first stage. 89 Finally, it included 31 municipalities to reinforce state level
strategies that were in line with SH. These considerations in addition to the inclusion of three
municipalities that were selected during the first stage based on alternative rules leads to a total
of 1,012 municipalities for the second stage, out of which 612 are new additions.90 The third
stage corresponds to the remaining municipalities in the country.

87

These 9 municipalities belong to four out of six municipalities that together hold 56% of the national objective
population.
88
The second stage covered an additional 26.7% of the objective population (SEDESOL, 2014).
89
“Tierra Caliente” is a region within the states of Michoacán, Mexico, and Guerrero characterized by a hot climate
mainly inhabited by indigenous communities.
90
(SEDESOL, 2014).
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A4.3. Multiperiod Difference in Difference Matching Methodology
Following Imai & Kim (2019) and Imai, Kim and Wang (2019), to form the matching sets for
any treated observation (𝑖, 𝑡) three sets of observations need to be defined: the within-unit
matched set 𝑀𝑖𝑡 , the within-time matched set, 𝑁𝑖𝑡 , and the adjustment set 𝐴𝑖𝑡 . The within-unit
matched set 𝑀𝑖𝑡 consists of an observation of that unit 𝑖 in the previous period if such
observation is untreated. The within-time matched, 𝑁𝑖𝑡 , set is defined as a group of control
observations from units in the same time period that share the same treatment history as 𝑖 from
time 𝑡 − 1 to 𝑡 − 𝐿, where 𝐿 is the number of lags 𝐿 characterizing the treatment history. The
adjustment set, 𝐴𝑖𝑡 , contains those untreated observations in the previous period corresponding to
the

units

in

𝑁𝑖𝑡

.

𝑀𝑖𝑡 = {(𝑖 ′ , 𝑡 ′ ): 𝑖 ′ = 𝑖, 𝑡 ′ = 𝑡 − 1, 𝑋𝑖 ′ 𝑡 ′ = 0 }

(1)

𝑁𝑖𝑡 = {(𝑖 ′ , 𝑡 ′ ): 𝑖 ′ ≠ 𝑖, 𝑡 ′ = 𝑡, 𝑋𝑖 ′ 𝑡 ′ = 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 ′ ∀ 𝑡 ′ = 𝑡 − 1, … 𝑡 − 𝐿}

(2)

𝐴𝑖𝑡 = {(𝑖 ′ , 𝑡 ′ ): 𝑖 ′ ≠ 𝑖, 𝑡 ′ = 𝑡 − 1, 𝑋𝑖 ′ 𝑡 ′ = 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 ′ ∀ 𝑡 ′ = 𝑡 − 1, … 𝑡 − 𝐿}

(3)

Equations (1), (2) and (3) define these sets for each treated observation with 𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 1 and
𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 = 0, i.e. a treated observation should be untreated in the preceding period. It is possible to
have some observations with empty sets and so with no control observations sharing the same
treatment history. This must be considered when interpreting results as these cases will be
excluded from the calculations. The multi-period DiD estimator of the Average Treatment effect
on the Treated (ATT), 𝜏̂ (𝐹, 𝐿), is an average of two-time period two-group DiD estimators for
any observation (𝑖, 𝑡) for which there is a change from control to treatment condition:
𝑁 𝑇−𝐹

1
̂
̂
̂𝐿) =
(1) − 𝑌𝑖,𝑡+𝐹
(0)),
𝜏(𝐹,
∑ ∑(𝐷𝑖𝑡 (𝑌𝑖,𝑡+𝐹
𝑇
∑𝑁
∑
𝐷
𝑖𝑡
𝑖=1 𝑡=1
𝑖=1 𝑡=1
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(4)

where 𝐷𝑖1 = 0 for all 𝑖, 𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝑋𝑖𝑡 ∙ 1{|𝑀𝑖𝑡 ||𝑁𝑖𝑡 | > 0} for 𝑡 > 1 and
̂
(𝑥)
𝑌𝑖,𝑡+𝐹

(5)
𝑌𝑖,𝑡+𝐹 ,

=
{

𝑌𝑖,𝑡+𝐹−1 +

1
|𝑁𝑖𝑡 |

∑

𝑌𝑖 ′ ,𝑡+𝐹 −

(𝑖 ′ ,𝑡)∈𝑁𝑖𝑡

𝑖𝑓 𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 1
1
|𝐴𝑖𝑡 |

∑

𝑌𝑖 ′ ,𝑡 ′ +𝐹 ,

𝑖𝑓 𝑋𝑖𝑡 = 0.

(𝑖 ′ ,𝑡 ′ )∈𝐴𝑖𝑡

The counterfactual outcome for observation (𝑖, 𝑡) consists of the difference between the
observed outcome in that period and its outcome in the previous period minus the difference
between the average outcomes across the same two time periods for the control units of (𝑖, 𝑡).
Notice that 𝜏̂ depends on 𝐹 and 𝐿. Since unit must be observed for 𝐹 time periods after the
treatment is administered and 𝐿 time periods before the treatment is administered, different
values of 𝐹 will affect the set of treated and control units. The method also allows to analyze the
effect of stable policies by finding matched control units based on the future treatment sequence.
In doing so the method classifies units as treated if treatment is in place for 𝐹 time periods and
their corresponding control units as those that are untreated during that same period.
Finally, the methodology proposed needs to adjusts for other confounders such as past
outcomes and time-varying covariates to better satisfy the parallel trend assumption by refining
the match control sets using different matching and weighting methods. The matching methods
used, the Mahalanobis distance and propensity scores, basically select a subset including up to a
specific number of most similar control units to the corresponding treatment unit. The weighting
method used, the inverse propensity score, essentially generalizes matching methods by
assigning weights giving more weight to those control units that are most similar to the treatment
unit instead of giving an equal weight.
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A4.4. All Multiperiod Difference-in-Difference Methodologies by Time of Implementation
Table A4.4.1. Estimated Average Contemporaneous Effects of SH on Birthweight Outcomes, all
Multiperiod Difference-in-Difference Methodologies

SH implemented as of X
quarters prior to birth
A. Fraction < 2,500 grams
SH (1 qrt)
Std. Dev.
% Impact (coef/mean)
SH (2 qrts)
Std. Dev.
% Impact (coef/mean)
SH (3 qrts)
Std. Dev.
% Impact (coef/mean)
SH (4 qrts)
Std. Dev.
% Impact (coef/mean)
N. of obs.

Multiperiod Difference-in-Difference Methodology
Mahalanobis
Before
Propensity
Propensity
Distance
Refinement
Score Matching
Score Weighting
Matching
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.0000
(0.0007)
-0.00%
-0.0031*
(0.0009)
-5.09%
-0.0007
(0.0007)
-1.17%
-0.0009
(0.0007)
-1.58%
19,870

0.0004
(0.0008)
0.61%
-0.004*
(0.0011)
-6.73%
-0.0022
(0.0007)
-3.70%
-0.0025
(0.0008)
-4.13%
19,870

0.0006
(0.0007)
0.97%
-0.0012
(0.0009)
-1.94%
0.0001
(0.0009)
0.15%
-0.0006
(0.0011)
-1.07%
19,870

0.0001
(0.0008)
0.22%
-0.0014
(0.0011)
-2.32%
-0.0005
(0.0007)
-0.75%
-0.0011
(0.0009)
-1.75%
19,870

B. Birthweight in grams
SH (1 qrt)
0.3155
0.1274
1.0403
1.0517
Std. Dev.
(1.4558)
(1.453)
(1.7592)
(1.5787)
% Impact (coef/mean)
0.010%
0.004%
0.03%
0.033%
SH (2 qrts)
4.5596**
5.9203***
1.6047
-0.4031
Std. Dev.
(1.8991)
(2.2218)
(1.8721)
(1.6843)
% Impact (coef/mean)
0.14%
0.187%
0.05%
-0.01%
SH (3 qrts)
0.7589
3.0141**
-2.0921
-0.2495
Std. Dev.
(1.3797)
(1.4146)
(1.7739)
(1.47)
% Impact (coef/mean)
0.02%
0.09%
-0.06%
-0.0%
SH (4 qrts)
1.0092
3.2779**
-2.4026
0.0372
Std. Dev.
(1.3036)
(1.4348)
(1.7976)
(1.5044)
% Impact (coef/mean)
0.03%
0.10%
-0.07%
0.00%
N. of obs.
19,870
19,870
19,870
19,870
Notes: Each parameter is from a separate regression of the outcome variable on SH implementation dummy. The
treatment is assigned as of 2, 3, and 4 quarters prior to birth. The estimation sample includes means by municipality
for years including 2008-2017 where municipalities with cells including less than 25 observations are dropped.
Estimates corresponding adjust for treatment, outcome and covariate histories during the five-year period prior to
treatment, i.e., L=5. Five different methods are considered. Controls include 2010 municipality variables (log of
population, percentage of land in farming, percentage of population five years or younger, percentage of population
65 years or older, unemployment rate and average income per capita), age, years of education, marriage status,
insurance availability, per capita public investments, and per capita social assistance transfers. Standard errors are in
parentheses. Standard errors correspond to block bootstrap replicates. *Coefficient is significant at 10% level.
**Coefficient is significant at 5% level. ***Coefficient is significant at 1% level.
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Table A4.4.2. Estimated Average Contemporaneous Effects of SH on Fertility and Fetal Deaths,
all Multiperiod Difference-in-Difference Methodologies

SH implemented as of X
quarters prior to birth

Multiperiod Difference-in-Difference Methodology
Mahalanobis
Before
Propensity
Propensity
Distance
Refinement
Score Matching
Score Weighting
Matching
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

A. Fertility rate per 10,000
SH (1 qrt)
-20.85***
-7.50
-10.01
-9.10
Std. Dev.
(4.1661)
(5.0461)
(6.5431)
(4.8648)
% Impact (coef/mean)
-15.4%
-5.55%
-7.41%
-6.74%
SH (2 qrts)
2.23
7.36*
2.52
-0.65
Std. Dev.
(4.2145)
(4.0624)
(4.8557)
(7.9361)
% Impact (coef/mean)
1.65%
5.45%
1.87%
-0.48%
SH (3 qrts)
-10.98
-1.11
-3.50
-3.58
Std. Dev.
(3.956)
(4.6362)
(6.6676)
(5.8401)
% Impact (coef/mean)
-8.13%
-0.82%
-2.59%
-2.65%
SH (4 qrts)
-10.98
-1.11
-3.50
-3.58
Std. Dev.
(4.0744)
(4.5538)
(7.0903)
(5.6046)
% Impact (coef/mean)
-8.13%
-0.82%
-2.59%
-2.65%
N. of obs.
19,500
19,500
19,500
19,500
B. Fetal death rate per 10,000
SH (1 qrt)
-0.08
-0.07
-0.04
-0.07
Std. Dev.
(0.2209)
(0.2348)
(0.2531)
(0.206)
% Impact (coef/mean)
-0.77%
-0.64%
-0.37%
-0.65%
SH (2 qrts)
0.106
0.032
-0.18
-0.20
Std. Dev.
(0.23)
(0.2353)
(0.3157)
(0.3725)
% Impact (coef/mean)
0.91%
0.27%
-1.62%
-1.80%
SH (3 qrts)
0.16
0.09
-0.24
-0.20
Std. Dev.
(0.2402)
(0.2574)
(0.3587)
(0.3635)
% Impact (coef/mean)
1.43%
0.77%
-2.14%
-1.77%
SH (4 qrts)
0.16
0.09
-0.24
-0.20
Std. Dev.
(0.251)
(0.2556)
(0.3572)
(0.3662)
% Impact (coef/mean)
1.43%
0.77%
-2.14%
-1.77%
N. of obs.
19,500
19,500
19,500
19,500
Notes: Each parameter is from a separate regression of the outcome variable on SH implementation dummy. The
treatment is assigned as of 2, 3, and 4 quarters prior to birth. The estimation sample includes means by municipality
for years including 2008-2017 where municipalities with cells including less than 25 observations are dropped.
Estimates adjust for treatment, outcome and covariate histories during the five-year period prior to treatment, i.e.,
L=5. Five different methods are considered. Controls include 2010 municipality variables (log of population,
percentage of land in farming, percentage of population five years or younger, percentage of population 65 years or
older, unemployment rate and average income per capita), age, years of education, marriage status, insurance
availability, per capita public investments, and per capita social assistance transfers. Standard errors are in
parentheses. Standard errors from the matching methods correspond to block bootstrap replicates. *Coefficient is
significant at 10% level. **Coefficient is significant at 5% level. ***Coefficient is significant at 1% level.
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Table A4.4.3. Estimated Average Contemporaneous Effects of SH on Birthweight Outcomes for
Income Eligible Individuals, all Multiperiod Difference-in-Difference Methodologies

SH implemented as of X
quarters prior to birth
A. Fraction < 2,500 grams
SH (1 qrt)
Std. Dev.
% Impact (coef/mean)
SH (2 qrts)
Std. Dev.
% Impact (coef/mean)
SH (3 qrts)
Std. Dev.
% Impact (coef/mean)
SH (4 qrts)
Std. Dev.
% Impact (coef/mean)
N. of obs.

Multiperiod Difference-in-Difference Methodology
Mahalanobis
Before
Propensity
Propensity
Distance
Refinement
Score Matching
Score Weighting
Matching
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-0.0054
(0.0039)
-9.00%
-0.0024
(0.0037)
-3.95%
0.0007
(0.0031)
1.15%
0.0007
(0.0031)
1.15%
1,040

-0.0053
(0.0037)
-8.8%
-0.0008
(0.0032)
-1.27%
0.0024
(0.0027)
4.07%
0.0024
(0.0028)
4.07%
1,040

0.001
(0.003)
1.71%
0.0007
(0.0036)
1.09%
0.0017
(0.0031)
2.80%
0.0017
(0.0033)
2.80%
1,040

0.0042
(0.0033)
6.92%
-0.0063
(0.0069)
-10.5%
0.0034
(0.0032)
5.63%
0.0034
(0.003)
5.63%
1,040

B. Birthweight in grams
SH (1 qrt)
-2.2758
-2.1188
-11.9217
-18.2769
Std. Dev.
(7.2284)
(7.5535)
(8.2151)
(9.2983)
% Impact (coef/mean)
-0.07%
-0.06%
-0.3%
-0.58%
SH (2 qrts)
-1.873
0.7235
0.356
9.2506
Std. Dev.
(6.432)
(6.8954)
(7.6776)
(10.7741)
% Impact (coef/mean)
-0.0%
0.02%
0.01%
0.29%
SH (3 qrts)
-2.7034
0.1239
-0.0995
2.639
Std. Dev.
(6.2846)
(6.4161)
(7.1635)
(7.7195)
% Impact (coef/mean)
-0.0%
0.00%
-0.00%
0.08%
SH (4 qrts)
-2.7034
0.1239
-0.0995
2.639
Std. Dev.
(6.2731)
(6.3386)
(7.1355)
(7.9856)
% Impact (coef/mean)
-0.0%
0.00%
-0.00%
0.08%
N. of obs.
1,040
1,040
1,040
1,040
Notes: Each parameter is from a separate regression of the outcome variable on SH implementation dummy. The
treatment is assigned as of 2, 3, and 4 quarters prior to birth. The estimation sample includes means by municipality
for years including 2008-2017 where municipalities with cells including less than 25 observations are dropped.
Estimates corresponding adjust for treatment, outcome and covariate histories during the five-year period prior to
treatment, i.e., L=5. Five different methods are considered. Controls include 2010 municipality variables (log of
population, percentage of land in farming, percentage of population five years or younger, percentage of population
65 years or older, unemployment rate and average income per capita), age, years of education, marriage status,
insurance availability, per capita public investments, and per capita social assistance transfers. Standard errors are in
parentheses. Standard errors correspond to block bootstrap replicates. *Coefficient is significant at 10% level.
**Coefficient is significant at 5% level. ***Coefficient is significant at 1% level.
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A4.5. Event study results
In this section I show the results from an event study on both the municipality-year means as
well as the individual level dataset for years from 2008 to 2017. For this purpose, I fit the
following equation:
4

𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝜋𝑗 1( 𝜏𝑖𝑚𝑡 = 𝑗) + 𝛾𝑚 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝛾𝑠𝑡 + 𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑚𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡

(1)

𝑗=−5

where 𝜏𝑖𝑚𝑡 denotes the event year, defined so that 𝜏𝑖𝑚𝑡 = 0 if the outcome observed at
municipality 𝑚 and year 𝑡 corresponds to the first year 𝑚 was intervened, 𝜏𝑖𝑚𝑡 = 1 if the
outcome corresponds to one year after the first year 𝑚 was intervened, and so on. 𝑋 ′ 𝑖𝑚𝑡 is a
vector of demographic control variables at the municipal and individual level, 𝛾𝑡 refers to year
fixed effects, 𝛾𝑚 refers to municipality fixed effects, 𝛾𝑠𝑡 refers to state by year fixed effects to
allow for different trends subnationally, 𝛼 is the regression intercept, and 𝜀𝑖𝑡 represents the
idiosyncratic error term. Outcomes corresponding to 𝜏𝑖𝑚𝑡 ≤ −1 pertain to years prior to an
intervention in the corresponding state. Coefficients are measured relative to 𝜏 = −1, the omitted
category. I consider a window of five years before and four years after the first intervention. The
outermost indicators include all previous or subsequent periods beyond five years respectively. If
SH is exogenous, coefficients corresponding to 𝜏 ≥ 0 should be statistically different from zero,
and coefficients corresponding to 𝜏 ≤ −1 close to zero.
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Figure A4.5.1. Event Study Analysis for Low Birth Weight and Birthweight using municipality
by year means

Notes: Each figure plots coefficients from an event-study analysis. Coefficients are defined as years relative to the
year SH is implemented in the municipality. The specification includes municipality fixed effects, year fixed effects,
state by year fixed effects, and controls at the municipality and individual level. The estimation presented in this
figure refers to the dataset with municipality-year means for years including 2008-2017.
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Figure A4.5.2. Event Study Analysis for Low Birth Weight and Birthweight using individual
observations

Notes: Each figure plots coefficients from an event-study analysis. Coefficients are defined as years relative to the
year SH is implemented in the municipality. The specification includes municipality fixed effects, year fixed effects,
state by year fixed effects, and controls at the municipality and individual level. The estimation sample includes
individual observations from 2008-2017.
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A4.6. Income Eligibility
The socioeconomic variables selected are both common to CUIS, a questionnaire that is
conducted on virtually any household applying for registration to a social program, and MCSENIGH, a national survey on income and expenditures of households.91 Based on these variables
the government estimates the following linear specification:
𝑙𝑛 𝑍𝑖 = 𝑆𝑖 ′𝛽 + 𝜖𝑖 .

(1)

where 𝑙𝑛 refers to the natural logarithm, 𝑍𝑖 is income, 𝑆𝑖 ′ is the vector of socioeconomic
variables and 𝜖𝑖 is the idiosyncratic error. The least squares model is estimated using
observations from MCS-ENIGH leading to the following equation:
𝑙𝑛𝑍̂𝑖 = 𝑆𝑖 ′𝛽̂ .

(2)

where 𝑍̂𝑖 is the estimated income and 𝛽̂ is the estimation of 𝛽 . The income of a particular
household is then calculated substituting the values of each of the selected variables for a
particular household 𝑗 into equation (2) to obtain the predicted income of that household:
𝑙𝑛𝑧̂𝑗 = 𝑠𝑗 ′𝛽̂ .

(3)

where 𝑧̂𝑗 is the predicted income for household 𝑗, 𝑠𝑗 ′ is the vector of selected variables with
values for 𝑗 and 𝛽̂ is the same vector of coefficients from (2). Since, households sampled in
CUIS are not necessarily sampled in MCS-ENIGH, this estimation corresponds to an out of
sample prediction.92 Once the government has the predicted income for a household it classifies
it as income eligible if the predicted income lies below the threshold selected by the government
uses for that year distinguishing between rural and urban areas. The criterium or threshold used
varies from one year to another and is known as Linea de Bienestar Minimo (LBM). I replicate

91

Encuesta Nacional de Ingreso y Gasto de los Hogares 2008 (MCS-ENIGH 2008). Cédula Única de Información
Socioeconómica (CUIS).
92
From the government perspective, estimating income using this methodology and not obtaining it directly from a
survey reduces chances of manipulation by recipients.

53

this methodology using the MCS-ENIGH and the corresponding thresholds for each year in my
period of analysis.
Since MCS-ENIGH is released every two years I use the information from MCS-ENIGH
from a particular year on the vital statistics information of that year and the following to make
the out of sample prediction.93 Instead of using household demographics included in CUIS to
predict household income, I use the demographics associated with mothers included in birth
records to predict household income. These demographics include age, education level, marriage
status, size of locality, health insurance status, type of health insurance, working status, and type
of job, all of which are characteristics observed in both the vital statistics and the MCS-ENIGH
datasets.
Table A6.1 shows the prediction accuracy within sample. Based on the list of
socioeconomic variables from the official methodology I select an analogous set of variables
available in the socioeconomic information in birth records. According to Table A6.1, around
80% of the observations are correctly classified as eligible or ineligible, and around 20% are
incorrectly classified as eligible or ineligible. The predictive accuracy of my methodology is
similar to that reported by the government for 2012, where around 83% of the observations are
correctly classified and 17% are incorrectly classified, SEDESOL (2015).
Using this indicator, I implement a triple difference in difference comparing eligible to
ineligible individuals within treated locations:
𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑚 = 𝛾0 + 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝐿𝐵𝑀) + 𝛾1 𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡𝑚 ⨂𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝐿𝐵𝑀)

(1)

+𝛾3 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑚 + 𝛾𝑚 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑚 ,

93

I use 2008 MCS-ENIGH for 2008 and 2009, 2010 MCS-ENIGH for 2010 and 2011, 2012 MCS-ENIGH for 2012
and 2013, and so forth.
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where 𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑚 represents the outcome variable; 𝑆𝐻𝑖𝑡𝑚 takes the value of 1 if the birth was exposed
to the program; 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑚 is a vector of individual and municipal level control variables; 𝛾𝑚 represent
municipality fixed effects; 𝛾𝑡 represents year fixed effects, and 𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑚 is the error term. If the
program had a beneficial impact, we would expect that eligible individuals do better in places
that are exposed to the program as opposed to those that are in unexposed locations. As it can be
observed from Tables A6.2, it appears that this is not necessarily the case. To discard this
possibility, I test for specifications that allow for more variation by not controlling for
municipality and year fixed effects. Instead, Table A6.3 shows the results from controlling for
state and year fixed effects while controlling for subnational trends, using region by year fixed
effects, as well as the poverty indexes used to select municipalities into each stage of SH. These
results show that the program was beneficial for income eligible women in exposed locations
relative unexposed locations.
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Table A4.6.1. Income Eligibility Estimation Accuracy
Classification
Model
2008
2010
2012
2014
2016

Correct
(1)
86%
81%
82%
82%
87%

Incorrect
(2)
14%
19%
18%
18%
13%

Each row represents accuracy measures for within sample predictions using information from MCS-ENIGH for
different years. The first column shows the fraction of women correctly categorized to be eligible or ineligible. The
second column indicates the fraction of women incorrectly categorized as eligible or ineligible.

56

Table A4.6.2 Linear Regression Estimates on the Effect of SH on Birthweight Outcomes,
interacting treatment condition with income eligibility
`

A. Birthweight < 2,500 grams
SH
Eligibility (LBM)
SH ⊗ Eligibility (LBM)
Dep. var. mean
N. of obs.
B. Birthweight in grams
SH
Eligibility (LBM)
SH ⊗ Eligibility (LBM)
Dep. var. mean
N. of obs.

SH implemented as of X quarters prior to birth
1 qrt
2 qrts
3 qrts
4 qrts

0.00036
(0.00038)
0.00155***
(0.00057)
0.00081
(0.00075)
0.06558
17,023,336

-0.00066*
(0.00039)
0.00141**
(0.00057)
0.00123
(0.00077)
0.06558
17,023,336

-0.00042
(0.00046)
0.00141**
(0.00056)
0.00134*
(0.00079)
0.06558
17,023,336

0.00087**
(0.00042)
0.00136**
(0.00055)
0.00162**
(0.00079)
0.06558
17,023,336

-5.19***
(0.99)
-11.50***
(1.41)
-1.71
(1.72)
3147.61
17,023,336

-1.76*
(0.93)
-11.46***
(1.39)
-1.93
(1.72)
3147.61
17,023,336

-0.47
(1.06)
-11.56***
(1.38)
-1.82
(1.74)
3147.61
17,023,336

-5.17***
(1.07)
-11.58***
(1.36)
-1.93
(1.78)
3147.61
17,023,336

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

Year fixed effects
Mun. fixed effects
Covariates

Notes: Each parameter is from a separate regression of the outcome variable on SH implementation dummy. The
treatment is assigned as of one quarter prior to birth, each column shows the estimate corresponding to each of these
timings. Eligibility (LBM) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if an individual is income eligible and 0
otherwise. The estimation sample includes individual level observations from 2008 to 2017. Controls include 2010
municipality variables (log of population, percentage of land in farming, percentage of population five years or
younger, percentage of population 65 years or older, unemployment rate, percentage of income eligible population,
and average income per capita) each interacted with a linear time trend, age, years of education, marriage status,
insurance availability, per capita public investments, and per capita social assistance transfers. Standard errors are in
parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *Coefficient is significant at 10% level.
**Coefficient is significant at 5% level. ***Coefficient is significant at 1% level.
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Table A4.6.3 Linear Regression Estimates on the Effect of SH on Birthweight Outcomes,
interacting treatment condition with income eligibility
`

A. Birthweight < 2,500 grams
SH
Eligibility (LBM)
SH ⊗ Eligibility (LBM)
Dep. var. mean
N. of obs.
B. Birthweight in grams
SH
Eligibility (LBM)
SH ⊗ Eligibility (LBM)
Dep. var. mean
N. of obs.

SH implemented as of X quarters prior to birth
1 qrt
2 qrts
3 qrts
4 qrts

0.00003
(0.00045)
0.00304***
(0.00061)
-0.00167**
(0.00080)
0.06558
17,023,336

-0.00094**
(0.00045)
0.00286***
(0.00060)
-0.00136*
(0.00082)
0.06558
17,023,336

-0.00083
(0.00052)
0.00283***
(0.00059)
-0.00140*
(0.00083)
0.06558
17,023,336

0.00026
(0.00050)
0.00270***
(0.00058)
-0.00114
(0.00085)
0.06558
17,023,336

-4.92***
(1.46)
-16.36***
(1.89)
2.74
(2.13)
3147.61
17,023,336

-1.67
(1.45)
-16.23***
(1.86)
2.69
(2.14)
3147.61
17,023,336

-0.57
(1.65)
-16.24***
(1.85)
2.98
(2.20)
3147.61
17,023,336

-4.39***
(1.56)
-16.14***
(1.80)
2.91
(2.23)
3147.61
17,023,336

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

Year fixed effects
State fixed effects
Region by year fixed effects
2010 Municipality Poverty Indexes
Covariates

Notes: Each parameter is from a separate regression of the outcome variable on SH implementation dummy. The
treatment is assigned as of one quarter prior to birth, each column shows the estimate corresponding to each of these
timings. Eligibility (LBM) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if an individual is income eligible and 0
otherwise. The estimation sample includes individual level observations from 2008 to 2017. Controls include 2010
municipality variables (log of population, percentage of land in farming, percentage of population five years or
younger, percentage of population 65 years or older, unemployment rate and average income per capita) each
interacted with a linear time trend, age, years of education, marriage status, insurance availability, per capita public
investments, and per capita social assistance transfers. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are
clustered at the municipality level. *Coefficient is significant at 10% level. **Coefficient is significant at 5% level.
***Coefficient is significant at 1% level.
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A4.7. Effect of SH on women already pregnant at the time of the introduction
The objective of the following specifications is to difference off treatment by time of exposure
for women that were already pregnant at the time of introduction. I center the analysis on women
living in the first set of municipalities treated, i.e. the first stage. In addition, this potentially
corrects for residential section bias of women moving to municipalities they anticipated to be
treated in later stages. I alternatively use women from each of the other stages. The main sample
to be analyzed consists of births occurring since the first month the program was launched in the
first stage until 40 weeks ahead, the typical duration of pregnancy. Succinctly, I use births that
occurred from April of 2013 to January of 2014 only in first stage municipalities.94 I start by
running the following specification:
𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑚 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1 𝑆𝐻2𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑚 𝑖𝑡𝑚 + 𝛾2 𝑆𝐻1𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚 + 𝛾3 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑚 + 𝛾𝑚 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑚 ,

(1)

Where, 𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑚 represents the outcome variable; 𝑆𝐻1𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑚 𝑚𝑡 takes the value of 1 if the baby was
born in October, November, December of 2013 or January of 2014 and 0 otherwise;
𝑆𝐻2𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑚 𝑚𝑡 takes the value of 1 if the baby was born in July, August or September of 2013 and
0 otherwise; 𝑆𝐻3𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑚 𝑚𝑡 , the omitted category, takes the value of 1 if the baby was born in
April, May or June of 2013 and 0 otherwise; 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑚 is a vector of individual control variables; 𝛾𝑚
represent municipality fixed effects; and 𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑚 is the error term. If the program was effective
among these women, those receiving the treatment for a longer period, i.e. births occurring
farther ahead from the starting date, should show better results.
In addition to the main specification I also interact the independent variables with the indicator
for individual level income eligibility:

94

First stage municipalities launch the program on 4/1/2013 (4/1/2013 + 40 weeks = 1/6/2014).
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𝑦𝑖𝑡𝑚 = 𝛾0 + 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝐿𝐵𝑀) + 𝛾1 𝑆𝐻2𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑚 𝑖𝑡𝑚 ⨂ 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝐿𝐵𝑀) +
𝛾2 𝑆𝐻1𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚 ⨂ 𝐸𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝐿𝐵𝑀) + 𝛾3 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝑚 + 𝛾𝑚 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑚 .
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(2)

Table A4.7.1 Linear Regression Estimates on the Effect of SH on Birthweight Outcomes,
sensitivity to time of introduction for already pregnant women during the first stage of
implementation

A. Birthweight < 2,500 grams
SH- 1st trimester
SH- 2nd trimester
Dep. var. mean
N. of obs.

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.00332***
(0.00062)
-0.00204***
(0.00072)
0.06087
835719

-0.00326***
(0.00062)
-0.00175**
(0.00069)
0.06087
835719

-0.00331***
(0.00061)
-0.00151**
(0.00069)
0.06075
783148

7.48***
(1.35)
0.34
(1.43)
3140.20
835719

6.26***
(1.35)
-2.12
(1.30)
3140.20
835719

5.91***
(1.39)
-2.29*
(1.31)
3138.91
783148

X

X
X

B. Birthweight in grams
SH- 1st trimester
SH- 2nd trimester
Dep. var. mean
N. of obs.
Mun. fixed effects
Covariates

Notes: Each column is from a separate regression of the outcome variable on SH implementation dummy. Sample
consists of births occurring since the first month the program was launched in the first stage until 40 weeks ahead in
time. Treatment is defined based on the time of birth relatively to the start of the program in April of 2013. 𝑆𝐻 −
1𝑠𝑡 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟 takes the value of 1 if the baby was born in October, November, December of 2013 or January of
2014 and 0 otherwise; 𝑆𝐻 − 2𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟 takes the value of 1 if the baby was born in July, August or September
of 2013 and 0 otherwise; 𝑆𝐻 − 3𝑟𝑑 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟, the omitted category, takes the value of 1 if the baby was born in
April, May or June of 2013 and 0 otherwise. Eligibility (LBM) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if an
individual is income eligible and 0 otherwise. Controls include 2010 municipality variables (log of population,
percentage of land in farming, percentage of population five years or younger, percentage of population 65 years or
older, unemployment rate and average income per capita) each interacted with a linear time trend, age, years of
education, marriage status, insurance availability, per capita public investments, and per capita social assistance
transfers. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *Coefficient is
significant at 10% level. **Coefficient is significant at 5% level. ***Coefficient is significant at 1% level.
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Table A4.7.2 Linear Regression Estimates on the Effect of SH on Birthweight Outcomes,
sensitivity to time of introduction for already pregnant women during the first stage of
implementation

A. Birthweight < 2,500 grams
Eligibility (LBM)
SH- 1st trimester
SH- 2nd trimester
SH- 1st trimester ⊗ Eligibility (LBM)
SH- 2nd trimester ⊗ Eligibility (LBM)
Dep. var. mean
N. of obs.
B. Birthweight in grams
Eligibility (LBM)
SH- 1st trimester
SH- 2nd trimester
SH- 1st trimester ⊗ Eligibility (LBM)
SH- 2nd trimester ⊗ Eligibility (LBM)
Dep. var. mean
N. of obs.

(1)

(2)

(3)

-0.01000***
(0.00178)
-0.00369***
(0.00065)
-0.00211***
(0.00077)
0.00390**
(0.00176)
0.00293
(0.00206)
0.06075
783,148

-0.00164
(0.00138)
-0.00357***
(0.00064)
-0.00179**
(0.00074)
0.00352**
(0.00174)
0.00317
(0.00206)
0.06075
783,148

-0.00110
(0.00169)
-0.00362***
(0.00064)
-0.00177**
(0.00074)
0.00330*
(0.00175)
0.00314
(0.00204)
0.06075
783,148

-12.96
(9.78)
8.37***
(1.50)
1.12
(1.64)
-9.98***
(3.80)
-7.51*
(4.26)
3138.91
783,148

-8.45**
(3.33)
6.72***
(1.49)
-1.41
(1.47)
-8.30**
(3.65)
-8.22**
(4.06)
3138.91
783,148

-11.70***
(4.01)
6.78***
(1.47)
-1.60
(1.47)
-7.09*
(3.69)
-8.16**
(4.06)
3138.91
783,148

X

X
X

Mun. fixed effects
Covariates

Notes: Each column is from a separate regression of the outcome variable on SH implementation dummy. Sample
consists of births occurring since the first month the program was launched in the first stage until 40 weeks ahead in
time. Treatment is defined based on the time of birth relatively to the start of the program in April of 2013. 𝑆𝐻 −
1𝑠𝑡 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟 takes the value of 1 if the baby was born in October, November, December of 2013 or January of
2014 and 0 otherwise; 𝑆𝐻 − 2𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟 takes the value of 1 if the baby was born in July, August or September
of 2013 and 0 otherwise; 𝑆𝐻 − 3𝑟𝑑 𝑇𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟, the omitted category, takes the value of 1 if the baby was born in
April, May or June of 2013 and 0 otherwise. Eligibility (LBM) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if an
individual is income eligible and 0 otherwise. Controls include 2010 municipality variables (log of population,
percentage of land in farming, percentage of population five years or younger, percentage of population 65 years or
older, unemployment rate and average income per capita) each interacted with a linear time trend, age, years of
education, marriage status, insurance availability, per capita public investments, and per capita social assistance
transfers. Standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level. *Coefficient is
significant at 10% level. **Coefficient is significant at 5% level. ***Coefficient is significant at 1% level.
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